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ABSTRACT 
Re ie J of the current electromagnetic interference 
control activities of the individual NASA Centers for ApoPlo 
and analysis of the potential problems of lightning protection, 
electrosta,tic charging phenomena and effects, and voltage 
breakdown of electrical equipment in the critical pressure 
region do not indicate the need for redirection o f  the current 
efforts in these areas. However, the need for more timely 
action in the coordination of the inter-center effort f o r  
achieving electromagnetic compatibility of the integrated 
elements in Apollo is indicated. 
Review of the electromagnetic compatibility vali- 
dation programs of the individual NASA Centers for Apollo 
reveals the existence of two different test philosophies to 
assure electromagnetic compatibility o f  the integrated systems 
of the individual stages of the launch vehicle and o f  the 
separate spacecraft modules, respectively. Clearly, testing 
in accordance with the requirements of a military specification 
for integrated system electromagnetic compatibility as will be 
performed on the individual stages of the Saturn launch vehicles 
will yield greater assurance of the electromagnetic compatibility 
of the integrated systems than will functional testing while 
monitoring subsystems performance for malfunction as wi1.l be 
performed on the individual spacecraft modules and on the 
integrated Apollo space vehicle, It is recognized that speci- 
fication testing of the individual spacecraft modules is not 
feasible in view o f  the tight schedule and that functional 
testing must be used to demonstrate electromagnetic compatibility. 
However, since very limited functional testing is currently 
planned to demonstrate the compatibility of the LEM and the 
CSM, it is recommended that the test program be expanded to 
include functional compatibility testing of the LEM and the 
CSM in their various mission configurations. 
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1.0 
REVIEW OF THE APOLLO ELECTROMAGNETIC 
COMPATIBILITY PROGRAM 
INTRODUCTION 
A review has been made of the electromagnetic inter- 
ference control and electromagnetic compatibility validation 
activities in the Apollo Program in order to assess its adequacy 
and to recommend modifications to these activities if appro- 
priate. Control of electromagnetic interference and the electro- 
magnetic compatibility of the various stages of the launcn 
vehicle, the two spacecraft, the associated ground support equip- 
ment, and the launch facilities are obvious elements of an accept- 
able Apollo system design. 
Electromagnetic compatibility of the overall system 
implies that any piece of electrical and electronic equipment 
will not malfunction or be significantly degraded in performance 
by the electrical and electromagnetic environment it shares with 
other elements of the integrated system and will not add radiated 
or conducted interference to that environment which could result 
in the malfunction or performance degradation of any other piece 
of equipment. 
In the pursuit of this work the following subtasks 
were performed: 
(a) review of the current electromagnetic interference 
control and electromagnetic compatibility validation 
activities of the individual NASA Centers from an 
overall Apollo Program viewpoint, 
(b) review of the electromagnetic compatibility experience 
in the Gemini Program for possible relevance or appli- 
cation to the Apollo Program, and 
(c) analysis of problems of special pertinence or novelty 
to Apollo including lightning protection, electrostatic 
charging phenomena and effects, voltage breakdown in 
electrical equipment occurring at critical pressures, 
f and formal courses on EMC proposed for NASA use. 
The results of the investigations conducted under the 
subtasks described above are summarized in Appendices A through 
G of this report. 
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A memorandum* summarizing t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r -  
f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l  a c t i v i t i e s  of  t h e  NASA Centers  f o r  t h e  
Apollo Program has been w r i t t e n  and i n c l u d e s  d i s c u s s i o n s  
o f  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
i n  e f f e c t ,  c e n t e r  management c o n t r o l  p rocedures ,  and i n t e r -  
c e n t e r  p a n e l  a c t i v i t i e s .  
Conclusions and recommendations f o r  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  program f o r  Apollo a r e  i n -  
cluded i n  S e c t i o n  2 . 0  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t .  P o t e n t i a l  problem 
a r e a s  uncovered d u r i n g  t h i s  review a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  Sec- 
t i o n  3 . 0 .  
2 . 0  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It became apparent  t h a t  t h e  pe r sonne l  working 
i n  t he  Apollo Program a r e  very aware of t h e  need f o r  e l e c t r o -  
magnetic c o m p a t i b i l i t y  programs o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  sys tems.  
Although t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  programs o f  
t h e  v a r i o u s  NASA Centers  f o r  Apollo were,  i n  some c a s e s ,  
delayed i n  s t a r t i n g ,  t h e  s e p a r a t e  programs a r e ,  for t h e  
most p a r t ,  p r o g r e s s i n g  w e l l  a t  t h i s  t ime and no m a j o r  
r e d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  c u r r e n t  i n t r a - c e n t e r  e f f o r t s  i s  i n -  
d i c a t e d .  The c o o r d i n a t i o n  of t h e  i n t e r - c e n t e r  e f f o r t  f o r  
ach iev ing  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  
elements  i n  Apollo a l s o  began l a t e  and t h e  need f o r  more 
t ime ly  a c t i o n  i s  i n d i c a t e d .  
The fo l lowing  recommendations a r e  made f o r  t h e  i m -  
provement o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  pro- 
gram f o r  
( a )  
Apollo:  
A s i n g l e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a t  t he  Kennedy Space Cen- 
t e r  shou ld  be v e s t e d  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  c o o r d i n a t i n g  a l l  o f  t he  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  
Kennedy Space Center  i n  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  area. 
The t e s t  program shou ld  be extended t o  v e r i f y  
t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  Lunar 
Excursion Module and t h e  Command and S e r v i c e  
Module. To accomplish t h i s  o b j e c t i v e ,  t h e  t e s t  
program s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  com- 
p a t i b i l i t y  t e s t s  of  or f u n c t i o n a l  t e s t s  to 
demonst ra te  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
of t he  Lunar Excurs ion  Module and t h e  Command 
and S e r v i c e  Module (1) when i n  t h e  docked con- 
*"Summary of  t he  E lec t romagne t i c  I n t e r f e r e n c e  Con t ro l  
A c t i v i t i e s  of  t h e  MSFC, t h e  KSC, and t h e  MSC f o r  t h e  Apollo 
Program," A.  G .  Weygand, Bellcomm TM-65-2021-7, August 9 ,  1965 .  
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f i g u r a t i o n  used f o r  t h e  t r a n s l u n a r  phase of t h e  
miss ion  and ( 2 )  when s e p a r a t e d  and i n  v a r i o u s  
o r i e n t a t i o n s  l i k e l y  to be encountered  du r ing  t h e  
s e p a r a t i o n  and t h e  rendezvous and docking phases  
o f  t h e  mis s ion .  
( c )  A t ime ly  exchange shou ld  be implemented between 
t h e  NASA Centers  of  waivers  to t h e  requi rements  
con ta ined  i n  t h e  i n t e r - c e n t e r  I n t e r f a c e  Con t ro l  
Documents on e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y .  
( d )  The e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l s  on t h e  
e l e c t r i c a l  i n t e r f a c e  between t h e  space  v e h i c l e  and 
i t s  e l e c t r i c a l  ground suppor t  equipment a r e  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  E l e c t r i c a l  Systems Pane l .  
However, t h e  I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  and Communication 
Panel  should  review t h e i r  EM1 c o n t r o l  documents to 
a s s u r e  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  of sources  of EM1 t h a t  could 
a f f e c t  communications. 
( e )  The I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  and Communication Panel  should  
e v a l u a t e  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  t e s t s  
and v a l i d a t i o n  programs f o r  t h e  end i t e m s  of t h e  
v a r i o u s  c e n t e r s  and t h e  o v e r a l l  t e s t  program f o r  
t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  space  v e h i c l e ,  ground suppor t  equip-  
ment, and t h e  launch f a c i l i t i e s  t o  determine whether  
t h e  t e s t  program w i l l  g i v e  a h igh  degree o f  c o n f i -  
dence i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
of  a l l  systems i n  Apollo.  
sponsored by t h e  Apollo Program O f f i c e  ( M A R ) ,  
should  not  b e  l i n k e d  to t h e  Apollo Program e x c l u s i v e l y  
bu t  should  be cons ide red  f o r - u s e  as a NASA-wide 
course .  
( f )  The "Elec t romagnet ic  Compa t ib i l i t y  Awareness Course , ' I  
( g )  The measures recommended i n  t h e  s tudy  of l i g h t n i n g  
p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  MILA Launch Complexes 34, 37 ,  and 
39 should  p rov ide  adequate  p r o t e c t i o n  w i t h i n  
t h e i r  i n t e n d e d  scope a f t e r  t h e y  are implemented. 
( h )  Although it  i s  r ecogn ized  t h a t  more expe r imen ta l  
data would be des i r ab le  for v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  space  
v e h i c l e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  charg ing  and d i s c h a r g i n g  a r e  
no t  expec ted  to cause hazardous s i t u a t i o n s  for t h e  
space  v e h i c l e  or t h e  a s t r o n a u t s  du r ing  t h e  Apollo 
mis s ions .  
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(i) Electrical and electronic equipments of Apollo- 
Saturn space vehicle should be designed to 
operate and tested for operation in the critical 
gas or air pressure region without performance 
degradation or malfunction. It would be highly 
desirable to perform comprehensive thermal-vacuum 
tests on a fully instrumented flight model of 
the Lunar Excursion Module and Command and 
Service Module for both nominal and emergency 
spacecraft conditions with all in-flight systems 
operating to verify and demonstrate proper 
voltage breakdown design of spacecraft systems. 
3.0 POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS 
3.1 CENTER MANAGEMENT CONTROL PROCEDURES 
The distribution of responsibility and the assign- 
ment of specific tasks within the organization of each of 
the NASA centers to assure electromagnetic compatibility of 
the end item from the respective center for the Apollo Program 
are outlined in Appendix A. 
Six directorates of the Kennedy Space Center (prior 
to May 1, 1966) had responsibilities in the various aspects 
of achieving electromagnetic compatibility of the Apollo- 
Saturn space vehicle, the associated ground support equip- 
ment, the launch facilities, and the launch complex. However, 
no single directorate has the overall responsibility for 
coordinating the electromagnetic compatibility activities 
of the center, although a group within the Information Systems 
directorate acts as a central surveillance organization for 
and assists the various directorates as requested in matters 
concerning electromagnetic interference control and electro- 
magnetic compatibility. 
units are involved in testing equipments, subsystems and 
systems, active liaison between testing organizations is 
especially important and the results of these tests should be 
coordinated for the integrated system, A central EM1 
control and compatibility organization would be more effective 
if it were the contact for all electromagnetic compatibility 
matters involving a center. In this role, it could direct, 
coordinate, snd monitor the overall electromagnetic com- 
patibility technical effort of the center. It is suggested 
that such a single and authoritative organization be 
considered for the Kennedy Space Center. 
As in many large organizations where several different 
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3 . 2  ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY VERIFICATION I N  APOLLO 
The agreements between t h e  NASA c e n t e r s  and t h e i r  m a j o r  
c o n t r a c t o r s  i n  t h e  area o f  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l ,  
i n t e g r a t e d  equipment and s y s t e m s  t e s t s  t o  b e  conducted t o  demon- 
s t r a t e  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  sys tems,  
and t h e  co -o rd ina t ion  of i n t e r - c e n t e r  e f f o r t  i n  ach iev ing  e l e c t r o -  
magnetic c o m p a t i b i l i t y  i n  Apollo are summarized i n  Appendix B .  
A s imilar  summary o f  t h e  program used t o  achieve  and v e r i f y  
e l ec t romagne t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  systems i n  Gemini 
i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  Appendix C .  
For t h e  most p a r t ,  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
a s su rance  and v e r i f i c a t i o n  program be ing  pursued f o r  Apollo 
compares f avorab ly  w i t h  t h e  Gemini program. A r e l a t i v e  r e d u c t i o n  
i n  t h e  scope of t h e  program was no ted  i n  some areas. To provide  
v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of  t h e  combined 
o p e r a t i o n s  of t h e  Gemini s p a c e c r a f t  and t h e  Agena D t a r g e t  
v e h i c l e  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  o r b i t a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  (bo th  docked and 
undocked) , a ser ies  o f  r a d i o  frequency and f u n c t i o n a l  compati- 
b i l i t y  t e s t s  were performed a t  Cape Kennedy. The t e s t s  i nc luded  
a s i m u l a t e d  mis s ion ,  i n v o l v i n g  rendezvous and docking of t h e  
Gemini s p a c e c r a f t  w i t h  t h e  Agena D t a r g e t  v e h i c l e ,  on t h e  r a d i o  
f requency tes t  range .  Also,  p r o p e r  Gemini/Agena D subsystems 
o p e r a t i o n  was demonstrated i n  a number of v e h i c l e  o r i e n t a t i o n s .  
However, i n  c u r r e n t  A p o l l o  t e s t  p l ann ing ,  no LEM/CSM e l e c t r o -  
magnetic c o m p a t i b i l i t y  t e s t s  w i l l  be  performed p e r  s e .  F u n c t i o n a l  
t e s t i n g  o f  t h e  h a r d l i n e  e l e c t r i c a l  i n t e r f a c e  between t h e  LEM and 
t h e  CSM w i l l  be accomplished w i t h  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  p h y s i c a l  docking 
by  us ing  an u m b i l i c a l  connec t ion .  Radio f requency c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
checks w i l l  c o n s i s t  o f  t h o s e  t e s t s  performed on t h e  e n t i r e  
space  v e h i c l e  du r ing  launch pad o p e r a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  LEM and the  
CSM o r i e n t e d  i n  t h e  launch c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  A t  no p rev ious  t ime 
w i l l  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  t e s t s  be performed on t h e  combined LEM and CSM. 
It i s  recommended t h a t  a more e x t e n s i v e  t e s t  program 
be cons ide red  f o r  demonst ra t ing  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  and func t ion -  
a l  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of  t h e  LEM and t h e  CSM. 
3 .3  INTER-CENTER PANEL ACTIVITIES 
I n t e r - c e n t e r  p a n e l  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  i n s u r e  e l ec t romagne t i c  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  i n  Apollo a r e  reviewed i n  Appendix B .  
The I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  and Communication Panel  has been 
a s s igned  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  c o o r d i n a t i n g  t h e  i n t e r - c e n t e r  
e f f o r t  f o r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  e l e c t r o r i a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  Apollo.  
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This responsibility includes (1) assigning frequencies to the 
space vehicle transmitters and receivers for minimum interference, 
(2) assuring electromagnetic compatibility of the interfaces be- 
tween the spacecraft and the launch vehicle, and (3) assuring 
electromagnetic compatibility between the space vehicle and the 
ground support equipment and launch facilities. These tasks have 
been delegated to the Electromagnetic Compatibility Subpanel of 
the Instrumentation and Communication Subpanel. 
Except for information on frequency allocations, the 
exchange of information among the centers concerning items 
pertinent to achieving electromagnetic compatibility of the 
interface between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft has not 
been sufficiently complete or timely to be effective. In 
particular, it is noted that the exchange between the centers 
of the lists of deviations or waivers granted by each center to 
the requirements contained in the electromagnetic compatibility 
interface control documents is not being done in time for a 
reasonably complete examination of the effect of the waivers. 
The interface between the space vehicle and electrical 
ground support equipment and the launch facilities is currently 
the responsibility of the Electrical Systems Panel. The Electrical 
Systems Panel has some interference controls on this interface 
scattered in various documents, but, for the most part, the 
controls consist of inforinal agreements between centers. The 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Subpanel has decided not to generate 
an electromagnetic compatibility interface control document 
covering this interface because it is believed that it is t o o  
late in the program for such a document to be useful. Further- 
more, the Electromagnetic Compatibility Subpanel has terminated 
all of its effort in this area and thue allowing the Electrical 
Systems Panel to control the interface as it sees fit. It is 
suggested that the Electromagnetic Compatibility Subpanel should 
collect the interference controls data which have been documented 
on this interface, and determine the informal agreements between 
the centers pertinent to achieving electromagnetic compatibility 
at this interface, and subsequently should review the information 
for possible indications of gross incompatibility. 
There has been some concern expressed by the Reliability 
and Quality Control Directorate of the Apollo Program Office about 
the absence of an electromagnetic compatibility specification 
covering the overall Apollo-Saturn space vehicle. The usefulness 
of such a document at this late date in the overall Apollo program 
is debatable. Since for the most part it is too late to make 
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significant changes in design criteria and design requirements 
without a significant cost and schedule impact, it appears that 
a more fruitful task for the Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Subpanel would be to review and evaluate the electromagnetic 
compatibility test and validation programs for the end-items 
being processed by the centers and the test plans for the 
integrated space vehicle, ground support equipment, and launch 
facilities to determine whether or not the successful completion 
of the test program will yield a high degree of confidence in 
the overall electromagnetic compatibility in Apollo. 
3.4 ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY AWARENESS COURSE 
The Reliability and Quality Directorate of the Apollo 
Program Office has contracted with the General Electric Company, 
Apollo Support Department, to prepare a course and a supporting 
text to promote an awareness of the importance of electromagnetic 
compatibility planning in Apollo and to disseminate electromagnetic 
interference control and electromagnetic compatibility information 
throughout the Apollo Program. Some background information on the 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Awareness Course is included in 
Appendix D. 
The Electromagnetic Compatibility Awareness Course 
contains information applicable to any program and not peculiar 
only to the Apollo Program. Since the course is intended to be 
an awareness course and not a design course where solutions and 
fixes to possible problems are outlined, the content of this 
course will have little impact on the Apollo Program at this 
late date. Furthermore, outside of occasional references to the 
spacecraft acceptance checkout equipment for Apollo as an example 
to illustrate a point in a lecture and of some discussion of the 
electromagnetic control specifications used in Apollo, the Apollo 
Program is never specifically discussed. 
It is recommended that this Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Awareness Course not be linked to the Apollo Program exclusively 
but be a general NASA-sponsored course for use in promoting elec- 
tromagnetic compatibility awareness in up-coming NASA programs. 
If this course were adopted as a NASA-wide course for 
use in training both NASA and contractor personnel, special care 
would need to be exercised in interpretating the requirements of 
contractually imposed military electromagnetic compatibility 
specifications and in discussing the required contents of electro- 
magnetic compatibility control and test plans. It is recommended 
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t h a t  i n p u t s  on t h e s e  s u b j e c t s  be s o l i c i t e d  f r o m  each NASA c e n t e r  
i n  o r d e r  to develop and p r e s e n t  a u n i f i e d  NASA i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of 
t h e  r equ i r emen t s  of e l ec t romagne t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
and of  t h e  mater ia l  which should be inc luded  i n  e l ec t romagne t i c  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  c o n t r o l  and t e s t  p l a n s .  
3 .5  L I G H T N I N G  PROTECTION 
The recommendation r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  by  
t h e  High Vol tage  Laboratory of t h e  General E l e c t r i c  Company of 
t h e  p r a c t i c e s  and p rocedures  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  pe r sonne l ,  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  ground suppor t  equipment and space v e h i c l e  ( i n  t r a n s i t  
o r  on t h e  launch  pad)  a t  Launch Complexes 34 ,  37 and 39 a t  M I L A  
a r e  reviewed i n  Appendix E .  The c a p a b i l i t y  to wi ths t and  s u r g e s  
gene ra t ed  by l i g h t n i n g  o f  t h e  many d i f f e r e n t  connected equipments 
w i t h i n  t h e  launch  complexes and space v e h i c l e  has not  been 
s p e c i f i e d  i n  these  recommendations. However, t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  NASA 
c e n t e r s  have been made aware o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  problem and have 
been asked to determine  whether t h e  v o l t a g e  or c u r r e n t  s p i k e s  
induced i n  any connected equipments w i l l  be harmful to t h e i r  
equipment and to prov ide  adequate  p r o t e c t i o n  i f  i n d i c a t e d .  
The measures f o r  l i g h t n i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  of Launch 
Complexes 34, 37 and 39 recommended by t h e  General  E l e c t r i c  
Company have been adopted by t h e  Kennedy Space Center .  These 
measures should p rov ide  adequate  p r o t e c t i o n  of  t h e  launch  
complexes w i t h i n  t h e i r  in tended  scope.  However, some c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
should be g iven  to t h e  p o s s i b l e  problem of g a l v a n i c  c o r r o s i o n  of 
bu r i ed  m e t a l l i c  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  launch  complex r e s u l t i n g  from 
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of e x t e n s i v e  b u r i e d  copper grounding systems.  
3 .6  ELECTROSTATIC CHARGING 
The more impor tan t  of p o s s i b l e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  charg ing  
and d i s c h a r g i n g  mechanisms as a p p l i e d  to t h e  space v e h i c l e  
o p e r a t i o n s  du r ing  t h e  launch  powered f l i g h t ,  space c o a s t ,  and 
l u n a r  s u r f a c e  o p e r a t i o n s  phases  o f  a l u n a r  l a n d i n g  mis s ion  and 
t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a p p l i c a b l e  experiments  are d i s c u s s e d  b r i e f l y  i n  
Appendix F. 
Although t h e  a c t u a l  p r o c e s s e s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  e l e c t r o -  
s t a t i c  charg ing  of t h e  space v e h i c l e  du r ing  engine o p e r a t i o n  
have no t  been determined,  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a s e r i e s  o f  exper iments  
on s t a t i c  f i r i n g s  o f  r o c k e t  eng ines  and t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  some 
a c t u a l  f l i g h t  exper iments  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  space v e h i c l e  w i l l  
a c q u i r e  an  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  charge d u r i n g  r o c k e t  engine o p e r a t i o n .  
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Because t h e  data a v a i l a b l e  a r e  f o r  s o l i d  f u e l  r o c k e t  eng ines  
and because of t h e  wide v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  d a t a ,  i t  i s  ex t remely  
d i f f i c u l t  to e s t i m a t e  t h e  magnitude of t h e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  charg ing  
e f f e c t  of  t h e  l i q u i d  f u e l  eng ines  of  t h e  S a t u r n  launch  v e h i c l e s .  
Also d i f f i c u l t  to e s t i m a t e  i s  t h e  magnitude of t h e  charg ing  
e f f e c t  on t h e  space  v e h i c l e  of t h e  t r i b o e l e c t r i c  charg ing  pro- 
c e s s e s  when ( a )  t h e  boost  p r o t e c t i v e  cover  i s  snatched from t h e  
s p a c e c r a f t  du r ing  t h e  launch  sequence, and ( b )  t h e  space v e h i c l e  
impacts  water ,  i c e  or d u s t  p a r t i c l e s  suspended i n  t h e  atmosphere 
du r ing  launch .  
R e s u l t s  o f  expe.riments on two f l i g h t  v e h i c l e s  designed 
to measure p o t e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  system ground p o i n t s  
o f  two s t a g e s  of t h e  launch  v e h i c l e  du r ing  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  maneu- 
v e r ,  however, i n d i c a t e  t h a t  no a p p r e c i a b l e  p o t e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  
e x i s t s  between launch  v e h i c l e  s t a g e s  d u r i n g  s e p a r a t i o n .  Although 
t h e s e  r e s u l t s  may not  be c o n c l u s i v e ,  t h e y  do suggest  t h a t  a r c i n g  
between l aunch  v e h i c l e  s t a g e s  d u r i n g  s e p a r a t i o n  w i l l  no t  be a 
problem 
E l e c t r i c a l  d i s c h a r g e s  w i t h i n  each  s t a g e  or s p a c e c r a f t ,  
except  f o r  p o s s i b l e  charge rea l ignment  v i a  s u r f a c e  s t r eamer ing  
f r o m  d i e l e c t r i c  s u r f a c e s  to conduct ing s u r f a c e s ,  w i l l  be p re -  
vented by adequate  bonding of a l l  conduct ing  s u r f a c e s  w i t h  t h e  
s i n g l e  p o i n t  ground of  each s t a g e  or s p a c e c r a f t .  Su r face  
s t r eamer ing  from t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  boos t  p r o t e c t i v e  cover  to t h e  
Launch Escape Tower l e g s  has been recognized  as  a p o s s i b l e  
problem a r e a  and s t e p s  have been t a k e n  to p r o t e c t  t h e  e l e c t r o -  
e x p l o s i v e  d e v i c e s  l o c a t e d  i n  t h i s  a r e a  f r o m  premature a c t i v a t i o n  
by  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  d i s c h a r g e s .  
The plasma of t h e  ionosphere  w i l l  a c t  as  an e f f i c i e n t  
d i s c h a r g e  mechanism as t h e  space v e h i c l e  r i s e s  i n t o  t h e  ionosphere  
d u r i n g  t h e  launch  maneuver and w i l l  l i m i t  t h e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  
charge  accumulat ion on t h e  space v e h i c l e  to non-hazardous amounts. 
It i s  known t h a t  s t e a d y  s t a t e  p o t e n t i a l s  o f  space 
v e h i c l e s  c o a s t i n g  i n  ear th  o r b i t  i n  t h e  ionosphere  w i l l  be a 
few v o l t s  n e g a t i v e .  For space v e h i c l e s  c o a s t i n g  i n  o u t e r  space ,  
i t  i s  expected t h a t  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o t e n t i a l  of t h e  space 
v e h i c l e  w i l l  r ange  from a few v o l t s  p o s i t i v e t o  a few v o l t s  
n e g a t i v e  depending upon which e f f e c t  p redominates ,  t h e  s o l a r  
wind or photoemission.  If a space  v e h i c l e  should a c q u i r e  a 
l a r g e  p o t e n t i a l  by an  independent  p r o c e s s  such as r o c k e t  engine  
o p e r a t i o n ,  t h e  ionosphere  w i l l  a c t  to d i s c h a r g e  t h e  space  v e h i c l e  
r a p i d l y .  The s o l a r  wind would a c t  i n  a similar manner, but t h e  
d i s c h a r g i n g  r a t e  w i l l  be unde r s t andab ly  s m a l l e r .  
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The e f f e c t s  of t h e  v a r i o u s  p o s t u l a t e d  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  
charg ing  and d i s c h a r g i n g  mechanisms of t h e  s o l a r  wind, photo- 
emiss ion ,  and motion on t h e  l u n a r  s u r f a c e  du r ing  l u n a r  s u r f a c e  
o p e r a t i o n s  cannot be  a c c u r a t e l y  e s t i m a t e d  because of t h e  absence 
of c e r t a i n  data.  Knowledge of t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  c o n d u c t i v i t y  and 
t h e  d i e l e c t r i c  c o n s t a n t  of t h e  m a t e r i a l s  composing t h e  l u n a r  
s u r f a c e  i s  r e q u i r e d  to determine  t h e  e f f e c t  of motion on t h e  
l u n a r  s u r f a c e .  Knowledge concern ing  t h e  l u n a r  magnetic f i e l d  
i s  r e q u i r e d  to determine  t h e  e f f e c t  of p o s s i b l e  s h i e l d i n g  of 
t h e  l u n a r  s u r f a c e  from t h e  s o l a r  wind. However, u s i n g  c u r r e n t  
b e s t  e s t i m a t e s  of these  p h y s i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  i t  i s  not  expected 
t h a t  dangerous charge  accumula t ions  w i l l  occur  du r ing  l u n a r  
s u r f a c e  o p e r a t i o n s  of t h e  LEM and t h e  a s t r o n a u t s .  
I n  summary, a l though  i t  i s  recognized  t h a t  more expe r i -  
menta l  data would be d e s i r a b l e  to v e r i f y  some of t h e  assumptions 
and conc lus ions ,  space v e h i c l e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  charg ing  and p o s s i b l e  
r e s u l t i n g  e f f e c t s  a re  not  expected to cause  hazardous s i t u a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  space v e h i c l e  or t h e  a s t r o n a u t s  d u r i n g  any of t h e  Apollo 
mis s ion  phases. The Elec t romagnet ic  Compa t ib i l i t y  Subpanel of  
t h e  I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  and Communication Panel  has proposed no 
f u r t h e r  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  expe r imen ta l ,  or p r e v e n t i v e  d e s i g n  e f f o r t  
i n  t h i s  area u n t i l  ev idence  appea r s  t h a t  shows a d d i t i o n a l  
a c t i v i t y  i s  warran ted .  
3 .7  VOLTAGE BREAKDOWN 
Appendix G c o n t a i n s  a d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  causes  of 
and problems i n  space  v e h i c l e s  r e s u l t i n g  from v o l t a g e  breakdown 
i n  equipments.  
Although v o l t a g e  breakdown i n  e l e c t r i c a l  and e l e c t r o n i c  
equipment can r e s u l t  from t h e  m u l t i p a c t o r  e f f e c t ,  i t  i s  a 
phenomenon r e q u i r i n g  s p e c i a l i z e d  c o n d i t i o n s  and i s  not  l i k e l y  to 
be a problem i n  Apollo.  
The p r o b a b i l i t y  of v o l t a g e  breakdown of e l e c t r i c a l  
and e l e c t r o n i c  equipment and of  an tennas  i s  enhanced by o p e r a t i o n  
i n  a plasma. However, t h e  t i m e s  d u r i n g  a mis s ion  when a plasma 
w i l l  be p r e s e n t  can be p r e d i c t e d  and t h e  e f f e c t s  can be a n t i c i -  
p a t e d  and t a k e n  i n t o  account  i n  t h e  mis s ion  and equipment p l ann ing .  
For i n s t a n c e ,  i t  i s  known t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  atmospheric  r e e n t r y  
phase of a space mis s ion ,  communications b lackout  between t h e  
s p a c e c r a f t  and e a r t h  based s t a t i o n s  w i l l  o ccu r  as  a r e s u l t  o f  
t h e  e f f e c t s  of  a plasma shea th  sur rounding  t h e  r e e n t e r i n g  space- 
c r a f t .  Consequent ly ,  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  communications equipment 
o p e r a t i n g  d u r i n g  t h i s  phase w i l l  be des igned  to s u r v i v e  t h e  la rge  
r e f l e c t e d  powers caused by o p e r a t i o n  i n  t h i s  s e v e r e  environment.  
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The major  cause o f  v o l t a g e  breakdown o f  e l e c t r i c a l  
and e l e c t r o n i c  equipments i n  space  v e h i c l e s  has been t h e  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  these equipments i n  t h e  c r i t i c a l  a i r  or gas 
p r e s s u r e  r e g i o n .  Equipment ambient p r e s s u r e s  f a l l i n g  i n  t h e  
c r i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  r e g i o n  can r e s u l t  from a v a r i e t y  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  
which cannot  always be a n t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  equipment d e s i g n .  
The re fo re ,  a l l  h i g h  v o l t a g e  equipment f o r  u se  i n  space  by nan- 
r a t ed  space  v e h i c l e s  shou ld  b e  des igned  and t e s t e d  to o p e r a t e  
i n  t h e  c r i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  r e g i o n .  
To da te  t h e r e  have been  no f a i l u r e s  expe r i enced  i n  
t h e  S a t u r n  launch  v e h i c l e s  which could  be a t t r i b u t e d  to 
v o l t a g e  breakdown phenomena. The Marshall Space F l i g h t  Center  
has been aware o f  t h i s  problem area and f o r  t h i s  r eason  has 
des igned  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  systems to o p e r a t e  a t  t h e  lowest  
p r a c t i c a l  v o l t a g e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  h igh  v o l t a g e  c i r c u i t r y  and 
components are  p o t t e d  and c i r c u i t  boards  are  cord-wood s t a c k e d  
and have a conformal c o a t i n g  a p p l i e d .  
The Manned S p a c e c r a f t  Center  has a l s o  recognized  
v o l t a g e  breakdown of e l e c t r i c a l  and e l e c t r o n i c  equipment as 
a p o s s i b l e  problem area.  Most o f  the  b l a c k  boxes to b e  c a r r i e d  
i n  t h e  Apollo s p a c e c r a f t  w i l l  undergo vacuum t e s t i n g  s e p a r a t e l y .  
During one of  t hese  t e s t s ,  v o l t a g e  breakdown occur red  i n  t h e  VHF 
t r a n s c e i v e r  to b e  c a r r i e d  by t h e  Apollo Lunar Excursion Module. 
Subsequent r e d e s i g n  of t h e  packaging o f  t h e  t r a n s c e i v e r  made 
p o s s i b l e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  o p e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  c r i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  r e g i o n .  
Although t e s t i n g  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  b l a c k  boxes f o r  
v o l t a g e  breakdown i n  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  environments  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  
t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  s p a c e c r a f t  shou ld  a l s o  be t e s t ed  i n  a s i m u l a t e d  
mis s ion  environment ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  launch phase ,  under  nominal 
and emergency s p a c e c r a f t  c o n d i t i o n s  because l o c a l  environments 
o f  equipments i n  t he  s p a c e c r a f t  may b e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
t h a n  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  environment .  T h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  could  be 
caused by decompression o f  s p a c e c r a f t  , subsequent  r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  , 
o u t g a s s i n g  o f  ma te r i a l s ,  and inadequa te  v e n t i n g  of  equipment 
e n c l o s u r e s .  Furthermore,  v o l t a g e  breakdown i n  w i r i n g  and 
connec tors  has proven to b e  a problem i n  o t h e r  space  v e h i c l e  
programs and i s  b e s t  t e s t e d  i n  t h e i r  i n t e n d e d  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
and p o s s i b l e  environments .  
Thermal-vacuum t e s t s  on t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  Lunar Excurs ion  
Module and Command and S e r v i c e  Module are p lanned  to be  conducted 
a t  MSC. Thermal-vacuum t e s t s  w i l l  a l s o  b e  performed a t  t h e  
Kennedy Space Cen te r  on some o f  t h e  f l i g h t  s p a c e c r a f t .  However, 
a l l  systems may no t  be o p e r a t i n g  d u r i n g  these  t e s t s ,  n o t a b l y  
t h e  communications equipments which use  h igh  v o l t a g e s  i n  some 
i n s t a n c e s .  
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Voltage breakdown problems i n c l u d i n g  problems i n  
wi r ing  and connec to r s  have f r e q u e n t l y  been uncovered i n  
s p a c e c r a f t  of o t h e r  space programs d u r i n g  thermal-vacuum 
t e s t i n g  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  s p a c e c r a f t .  It would be h i g h l y  
d e s i r a b l e  to perform comprehensive thermal-vacuum tests f o r  
nominal and emergency f l i g h t  s p a c e c r a f t  c o n d i t i o n s  to v e r i f y  
and demonst ra te  p rope r  v o l t a g e  breakdown d e s i g n  o f  t h e  space-  
c r a f t  s y s t e m s .  
2012-AGW-gdn 
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CENTER MANAGEMENT CONTROL PROCEDURES TO ASSURE 
APOLLO ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY 
1 . 0  Genera l  
The e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l  and e l e c t r o -  
magnetic c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  r e spons i -  
b i l i t i e s  and t h e i r  f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h i n  each of t h e  
NASA Centers  are o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  fo l lowing  pa rag raphs .  
2 . 0  Marshall Space F l i g h t  Center  
The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  p rov id ing  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c a l l y  
compatible  o p e r a t i o n  of t he  S a t u r n  launch  v e h i c l e s  and a s s o c i a t e d  
ground suppor t  equipment i s  s h a r e d  by two of  t h e  l a b o r a t o r i e s  under 
Research and Development Opera t ions  a t  t h e  Marshall Space F l i g h t  
Center .  The A s t r i o n i c s  Laboratory i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i n s u r i n g  pro- 
p e r  d e s i g n  and t e s t  of launch v e h i c l e  f l i g h t  equipment and t h e  
a s s o c i a t e d  ground suppor t  equipment r e q u i r e d  f o r  pre launch  check- 
o u t .  The Q u a l i t y  and R e l i a b i l i t y  Assurance L a b o r a t o r y  i s  respon- 
s i b l e  f o r  i n s u r i n g  p r o p e r  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l  
des ign  and t e s t  of launch  v e h i c l e  checkout equipment n o t  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  use i n  t h e  launch  a r e a .  The Q u a l i t y  and R e l i a b i l i t y  Assurance 
Laboratory a l s o  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t he  performance or moni tor ing  
o f  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  t e s t i n g  of t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  
s t a g e  and a s s o c i a t e d  ground s u p p o r t  equipment,  b u t  t h e  A s t r i o n i c s  
Laboratory i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  c o r r e c t i o n  of any i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s  
r e v e a l e d  du r ing  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  t e s t s .  Both l a b o r a t o r i e s  ma in ta in  
c l o s e  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of each o t h e r  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  
e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  bo th  
l a b o r a t o r i e s  review a l l  c o n t r a c t o r  documentation p e r t a i n i n g  to 
e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l  i n  and compatible  o p e r a t i o n  
of i n t e g r a t e d  s t a g e  and a s s o c i a t e d  ground suppor t  equipment.  
The Marshall Space F l i g h t  Center  has  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  t h e  compatible  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  S a t u r n  launch  v e h i c l e  
i n  a l l  mis s ion  modes a l though t h e  Kennedy Space Center  has t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  performance of t e s t s  t o  v e r i f y  t h i s  com- 
p a t i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  launch  area. 
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3.0  Manned S p a c e c r a f t  Center  
The e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  e f f o r t  and respon- 
s i b i l i t y  a t  t h e  Manned S p a c e c r a f t  Center  f o r  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  and 
t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  ground suppor t  equipment i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  over  t h e  
system and subsystem eng inee r ing  l e v e l s .  The e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  sys t ems  eng inee r  of t h e  Apollo Spacec ra f t  Program 
O f f i c e  d e f i n e s  and s p e c i f i e s  t h e  o v e r a l l  system e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  requi rements  f o r  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  and a s s o c i a t e d  
ground suppor t  equipment and moni tors  t h e  o v e r a l l  program to i n -  
s u r e  s y s t e m  e l ec t romagne t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  requi rements  a r e  
s a t i s f i e d .  The v a r i o u s  subsystem managers w i t h i n  t h e  Engineer-  
i n g  and Development d i r e c t o r a t e  a r e  t h e n  r e s p o n s i b l e  for t r a n s -  
l a t i n g  t h e  o v e r a l l  s y s t e m  requi rements  i n t o  des ign  and t e s t  
requi rements  f o r  s p e c i f i c  subsystems and f o r  moni tor ing  p r o g r e s s  
to ensu re  subsystem compliance w i t h  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
c o n t r o l  r equ i r emen t s .  
The Manned S p a c e c r a f t  Center  has t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e  compatible  o p e r a t i o n  of t h e  o v e r a l l  Apollo s p a c e c r a f t  i n  a l l  
mis s ion  modes a l though t h e  Kennedy Space Center  has t h e  respon-  
s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  performance of t e s t s  to v e r i f y  t h i s  compati- 
b i l i t y  i n  t h e  launch  a r e a .  
4 . 0  Kennedy Soace Center  
A t  t h e  Kennedy Space Center  s i x  d i r e c t o r a t e s  a r e  con- 
cerned w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  of t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  compati- 
b i l i t y  o f  t h e  space  v e h i c l e ,  t h e  ground suppor t  equipment,  t h e  
launch f a c i l i t i e s ,  and t h e  launch  complex. While t he  r e spons i -  
b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  l e v e l  o f  e f f o r t  i n  ach iev ing  e l ec t romagne t i c  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  i n  t he  a r e a s  of each  r e s p e c t i v e  d i r e c t o r a t e  i s  
r e t a i n e d  by t h a t  d i r e c t o r a t e ,  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i t h i n  one of  t h e  
d i r e c t o r a t e s  a c t s  as a c e n t r a l  s u r v e i l l a n c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  and 
ass i s t s  t h e  va r ious  d i r e c t o r a t e s  of the  Kennedy Space Center  as 
r e q u e s t e d  i n  matters of  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y .  However, 
t h e  v a r i o u s  d i r e c t o r a t e s  a r e  n o t  r e q u i r e d  to keep t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
up to d a t e  on e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  a c t i v i t i e s  t a k i n g  
p l a c e  under  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  cognizance.  
The o v e r a l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for v e r i f y i n g  electromag- 
n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of t h e  v a r i o u s  e lements  w i t h i n  t h e  launch 
a r e a  i s  d i v i d e d  among t h e  v a r i o u s  d i r e c t o r a t e s  o f  the  Kennedy 
Space Center  as f o l l o w s :  
( a )  Launch Vehic le  Opera t ions  - demonst ra t ion  of t h e  
e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of t h e  launch v e h i c l e  
w i t h  t h e  environment , bo th  conducted and r a d i a t e d  
a t  t he  launch complex provided  by t h e  s p a c e c r a f t ,  t h e  
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ground suppor t  equipment,  t h e  launch  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and 
t h e  l o c a l  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  environment produced by  
f a c i l i t i e s  e x t e r n a l  to t he  launch a r e a .  
( b )  S p a c e c r a f t  Opera t ions  - demonst ra t ion  of t h e  e l e c t r o -  
magnetic c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  w i t h  t h e  en- 
vironment,  bo th  conducted and r a d i a t e d ,  a t  t h e  launch 
complex provided  by t h e  launch v e h i c l e ,  t h e  ground 
suppor t  equipment,  t h e  launch f a c i l i t i e s ,  and t h e  l o c a l  
e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  environment produced by f a c i l i t i e s  
e x t e r n a l  to t h e  launch a r e a .  
( c )  Q u a l i t y  Assurance - c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  electromag- 
n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  c o n t r o l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  compliance by  
e l e c t r i c a l  and e l e c t r o n i c  equipments procured  by t h e  
Kennedy Space Center .  
( d )  Support  Opera t ions  - p r o v i s i o n  o f  t h e  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c a l l y  
compatible  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  communication and d a t a  
t r a n s m i s s i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  launch a r e a .  
( e )  Engineer ing  and Development - c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  
e n s u r i n g  p rope r  s t r u c t u r a l  bonding,  grounding,  power 
grounding and d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  e t c .  
( f )  I n fo rma t ion  Systems - p r o v i s i o n  o f  a s s i s t a n c e  to o t h e r  
d i r e c t o r a t e s  i n  t h e  a r e a  of e l ec t romagne t i c  i n t e r -  
f e rence  c o n t r o l  as r e q u e s t e d  i n c l u d i n g  performance 
of e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  t e s t i n g  of i n d i v i d u a l  
equipments;  p r e p a r a t i o n  of  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  compati- 
b i l i t y  c o n t r o l  p l a n s ,  t e s t  p l a n s ,  t e s t  p rocedures ,  
t e s t  r e p o r t s ,  and d e s i g n  g u i d e l i n e s ;  performance o f  
launch v e h i c l e ,  s p a c e c r a f t  and ground suppor t  equip-  
ment c o m p a t i b i l i t y  t e s t s  i n c l u d i n g  moni tor ing  command- 
d e s t r u c t  r e c e i v e r s  and e l e c t r o - e x p l o s i v e  device  f i r i n g  
c i r c u i t s  f o r  p o s s i b l e  d e t r i m e n t a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e ;  per -  
formance o f  ambient e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
envi ronmenta l  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  M e r r i t t  I s l a n d  Launch 
Area; and management o f  r a d i o  frequency assignment 
i n  t h e  M e r r i t t  I s l a n d  Launch Area i n c l u d i n g  t h e  co- 
o r d i n a t i o n  of f requency assignments  between NASA and 
t h e  A i r  Force E a s t e r n  T e s t  Range. 
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PROGRAM TO VERIFY ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY IN APOLLO - -  
1.0 General 
Electromagnetic interference control specifications for 
the most part form the basis of the programs of the various NASA 
Centers to insure electromagnetic compatibility of the various 
systems in Apollo. The contractual agreements bet.ween the NASA 
Centers and their respective major contractors and the inter- 
center panel co-ordination activities in the area of electro- 
magnetic interference control and the integrated equipment tests 
to be performed to demonstrate the electromagnetic compatibility 
of the various systems in Apollo are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
2.0 Electromagnetic Interference Control Specifications 
Contractually Imposed 
2.1 Stages of the Saturn Launch Vehicles 
The Marshall Space Flight Center has included in the 
negotiated contracts with the prime contractors for the various 
stages and the Instrument Unit (IU) of both the Saturn IB and 
Saturn V launch vehicles the military electromagnetic interference 
specifications, MIL-I-6181D and MIL-E-6051CY and the military 
electrical bonding specification, MIL-B-5087A. The design and 
test of the electrical and electronic equipments of all stages 
and the IU and associated ground support equipment are required 
to comply with the requirements of specification MIL-I-6181D. 
The requirements of specification MIL-E-6051C apply to each 
completely integrated stage or IU and tests are required to be 
performed by the contractor to demonstrate a minimum of 6 db of 
margin between the desired signal and the interference noise at 
the most critical point of subsystems on either stage of IU. 
There are currently no electromagnetic compatibility specifi- 
cations covering the entire Saturn launeh vehicle. 
2.2 Spacecraft Modules 
In the current electromagnetic compatibility program of 
the Manned Spacecraft Center f o r  Apo l lo ,  the prime contractors 
for the CSM and the LEM are contractually required to design the 
integrated spacecraft (CSM or LEM) and the associated ground 
support equipment (GSE) using the military electromagnetic 
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compatibility specification MIL-E-6051C as a guide and 
attempting to maintain at least a 6 db safety factor against 
all electromagnetic interference caused malfunctions or 
performance degradations. Tests to demonstrate the success 
of this design effort are not contractually required. There 
are currently no electromagnetic compatibility specifications 
covering the integration of the CSM and the LEM. 
However, the interface control document, "NAA/GAEC 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Design Criteria ICD", dated 
June 1 7 ,  1965, between North American Aviation, Inc. and the 
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Company describes the electro- 
magnetic compatibility design requirements that shall be used 
for the design of all interfaces between the LEM, the Block I1 
CSM, and the Spacecraft - Lunar Excursion Module Adapter. 
To minimize the number of electromagnetic incompati- 
bilities in either the integrated CSM or the integrated LEM, 
the prime contractors are contractually required to design 
and test all electrical and electronic equipments in accordance 
with the military electromagnetic inteference specification MII,- 
1-26600 as amended by the addendum MSC-EMI-lOA, or the equivalent. 
The electromagnetic interference testing of the electrical and 
electronic equipments will be limited to one of each type of 
equipment unless modifications are made in the piece of equip- 
ment which would require further testing or retesting. 
2.2.1 Command and Service Module, and Launch Escape System 
The prime contractor for the CSM, North American 
Aviation, Inc., has required that all deliverable electrical and 
electronic hardware from subcontractors or from in-house groups 
except the communication equipments meet the requirements of the 
North American Aviation, Inc., electromagnetic interference 
control specification MCggg-0002B. The communication equipments 
are required to meet the electromagnetic interference control 
requirements included in the communication and data subsystem 
procurement specification MCggg-OO23C. The electromagnetic 
interference control design and test requirements contained in 
these two documents are comparable and are essentially equivalent 
to the military specification MIL-1-26600 as amended by the 
addendum MSC-EMI-1OA. 
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2.2.2 Lunar Excursion Module 
The prime contractor for the LEM, Grumman Aircraft 
Engineering Company, has required that all deliverable electrical 
or electronic hardware from subcontractors or from in-house 
groups meet the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Company electro- 
magnetic interference control specification LSP-530-001. The 
design and test requirements contained in LSP-530-001 are 
essentially equivalent to the requirements contained in the 
military specification M I L - I - ~ ~ ~ O O  as amended by the addendum 
MSC-EMI-1OA. 
3.0 Inter-Center Panel Activities to Insure Electromagnetic 
Compatibility in Apollo 
The Instrumentation and Communication Panel has taken 
the initiative in eo-ordinating the inter-center effort for the 
control of electromagnetic interference in the Apollo Program. 
The Instrumentation and Communication Panel has delegated the 
responsibility in this area to the Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Subpanel. The responsibilities of this subpanel as outlined in 
its charter include allocating frequencies to space vehicle 
transmitters and receivers on a minimum interference basis and 
insuring electromagnetic compatibility of the interfaces between 
the spacecraft and the launch vehicle, and between the space vehicle 
and the ground support equipment and the launch facilities. 
The possible radio frequency interference problems 
arising from frequency allocations for space vehicle transmitters 
and receivers have been examined for both the Apollo Saturn IB 
and Apollo Saturn V space vehicles. Interface Control Document 
13M60003, "Saturn-Apollo Frequency Plan," has been issued by 
the Instrumentation and Communication Panel and contains a 
statement of the allocated frequencies for each Apollo Saturn 
IB and Apollo Saturn V space vehicle. 
Interface Control Document 13M60004, "Saturn-Apollo 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Design Criteria," (attached as 
Appendix H) has also been issued by the Instrumentation and 
Communication Panel and defines the spacecraft and launch vehicle 
interface electromagnetic compatibility design requirements. 
Since this document encompasses some areas which are under the 
purview of the Electrical Systems Panel, it was eo-ordinated with 
that panel prior to official issuance. Under the provisions of 
Interface Control Document 13M60004, the Manned Spacecraft Center 
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and the Marshall Space Flight Center each are required to 
prepare and exchange a list of all deviations.and/or waivers to 
the requirements of this document. These lists are to be 
examined by the respective centers and any suspected incom- 
patibilities resulting from granting any deviation and/or waiver 
are to be submitted to the Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Subpanel for examination. If necessary, the deviation or 
waiver will be re-submitted by the subpanel to the center which 
approved it for reconsideration. 
4.0 Integrated Systems Tests Performed Prior to Acceptance 
4;l Stages of Saturn Launch Vehicle 
Electromagnetic compatibility testing in accordance 
with the requirements of the military specification MIL-E-6051C 
will be performed as contractually required on each flight 
configuration stage of the Saturn vehicle at the checkout 
facility or manufacturing site of each major contractor. Each 
stage contractor is required to perform a comprehensive stage 
system electromagnetic compatibility test which includes 
testing to demonstrate a minimum safety margin of 6 db between 
the desired signal and the interference noise at the most 
critical point of a subsystem, testing to demonstrate no mal- 
function or performance degradation of a subsystem due to 
electromagnetic interference, and testing for detrimental 
transients on power busses while all stage and associated 
ground support equipments are operated through their normal 
flight sequence. The test points monitored during these tests , 
are chosen because they indicate performance of flight critical 
circuits or of inherently noisy circuits. The individual stage 
contractors have been encouraged to perform as e a r l y  in the 
program as possible investigative electromagnetic interference and 
susceptibility tests with individual stage and ground equipments 
energized to detect basic incompatibilities and to provide a 
data base and performance history to aid in the evaluation of 
future test results. 
The Marshall Space Flight Center performs or monitors 
the performance of radiation interference generation measurements 
with all intentional radiators operating simultaneously and of 
radiation susceptibility measurements on the receiving and trans- 
mitting subsystems of the individual stages to aid in determining 
if the stages will be radio frequency compatible when stacked. 
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4.2 Spacecraft Modules 
4.2.1 Command Module, Service Module, and Launch Escape System 
Tests will be performed at the North American 
Aviation, Inc. manufacturing location (Downey) on each flight 
spacecraft to assure flight readiness of the CIVI, SM, and the 
launch escape system and to verify the compatibility of the 
interfaces between the CM, SM, the launch escape system and 
the associated ground support and acceptance checkout equip- 
ment. These tests will include individual subsystem functional 
tests, integrated subsystems functional tests and finally 
simulated mission tests. During the integrated subsystem 
checkout and the simulated mission tests using the acceptance 
checkout equipment, the various subsystems will be exercised 
through various operational modes including abort modes and 
normal flight modes for the demonstration of operational 
compatibility of the various subsystems of the spacecraft. 
In addition to monitoring performance of the critical 
spacecraft subsystems, special attention will be given to 
monitoring transients and other types of interference conducted 
on both the ac and dc power distribution subsystems during the 
functional tests and checkout operations, Limited electro- 
magnetic interference and spectrum signature test measurements 
will be performed on each spacecraft but only as required to 
assure resolution of electromagnetic interference problems 
encountered during earlier tests or in earlier spacecraft. 
This limited electromagnetic interference test data together 
with the results of the integrated subsystems tests and acceptance 
checkout data on each spacecraft is expected to provide the 
necessary information for evaluating the electromagnetic com- 
patibility of spacecraft performance, 
Earlier in the program prior to production of flight 
spacecraft a house spacecraft was used in performing electro- 
magnetic compatibility tests on individual subsystem and 
integrated systems, in indicating corrective action, and in 
evaluating design modifications. 
4.2.2 Lunar Excursion Module 
Tests will be performed at the Grumman Aircraft 
Engineering Company manufacturing location (Bethpage) on each 
flight spacecraft and associated ground support and acceptance 
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checkout equipment to demonstrate the compatible operability 
of the spacecraft subsystems and to verify mission readiness 
of the integrated spacecraft and associated ground support 
equipment. These tests will include functional subsystem 
tests and checkout during subsystem and stage build-up and 
integrated subsystem functional tests and checkout of the final 
spacecraft stages. In addition to the integrated spacecraft 
checkout by the acceptance checkout equipment, the performance 
of all critical spacecraft subsystems will be monitored during 
the performance of mission oriented tests when the spacecraft 
subsystems will be exercised in the various operational modes 
and combinations. 
Electromagnetic compatibility of the subsystems will 
be confirmed in the house spacecraft which will also be used 
in spectrum signature tests. 
5.0 Test Performed at Cape Kennedy 
The functional compatibility and operational readiness 
of the integrated Apollo Space Vehicle and associated ground 
support equipment will be demonstrated by the successful 
completion of a series of tests, checkouts and simulated missions 
performed at the Merritt Island Launch Area. In general, electro- 
magnetic compatibility of an assembled or partially assembled 
space vehicle will be checked by performing functional tests on , 
the assembly and monitoring critical subsystems for performance 
degradation, monitoring ordnance subsystems for interference 
which could cause premature ignition, and monitoring power 
distribution systems for transient identification as indications 
of incompatibility. 
5.1 Launch Vehicle Integration 
Inspection upon receipt and limited subsystems testing 
will be performed on the various stages and ground support 
and checkout equipment to ensure proper subsystem installation 
and operation prior to stage mating and checkout. After mating 
operations have been completed, the test program will essentially 
follow a building block pattern starting with initial checks at 
the equipment level and progressively expanding into subsystem 
and system tests and finally integrated system tests. The 
detailed subsystem and system tests will ensure complete system 
integrity and will verify proper system operation. 
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Integrated launch vehicle system tests and checkout 
will be performed to demonstrate that each system is compatible 
with other systems, that each stage is compatible with other 
stages and that all systems are compatible with the associated 
ground support equipment, Overall tests will then be performed 
to verify the integrity and compatibility of the launch 
vehicle and the associated ground support equipment electronic, 
electrical and mechanical systems while all systems are 
operating according to a modified and abbreviated countdown 
with the flight program. Finally a simulated flight test will 
be performed including the pre-count, countdown, and flight 
phases of its mission with all launch vehicle and ground 
support equipment systems operating as close as possible to 
launch day configuration to checkout all systems and to verify 
compatibility of operation and readiness for participation in 
space vehicle checkout of the complete launch vehicle and 
associated ground support equipments. However, no radio 
frequency interference tests with transmitters and receivers 
operating will be performed at this time. Malfunction 
sequence tests will also be performed to verify the compati- 
bility and proper operation of the launch vehicle systems 
under non-nominal conditions. 
5.2 Spacecraft Integration 
Significant reductions in the originally conceived 
procedures for spacecraft launch operations and checkout at 
MILA are currently being considered. for both the CSM and the 
LEM which would eliminate much of the redundant tests made at 
different locations and would aim to perform checkout at as 
high an assembly level as possible consistent with the'cost 
and schedule slip for repair. Specifically, experience will 
be gained on reduced testing of CSM 011, 012, and 014 with the 
objective of obtaining the necessary confidence f o r  shipping 
CSM 017 directly to the Vertical Assembly Building. 
For CSM 011, 012, and 014 after a brief receiving 
inspection, the CM and SM will be mated and placed in the 
altitude chamber. After completion of systems verification 
functional checkout and polarity checks, the assembled CSM 
and associated ground support equipment will undergo simulated 
flight tests and simulated flight abort tests to demonstrate the 
operational performance readiness of the integrated spacecraft 
for mating with the launch vehicle. After being mechanically 
mated to the launch vehicle on the pad, integrated systems tests 
will be performed using a launch vehicle simulator. 
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For CSM 017 and subsequent, after a brief receiving 
inspection, the CM and the SM will be mated and be moved to 
the polarity fixture in the Vertical Assembly Building where 
polarity checks and systems verification tests will be made. 
The CSM will then be mated with SLA which had already been 
mated with the LEM Test Article. This assembly will then be 
mechanically mated to the launch vehicle and integrated 
systems tests including simulated launch tests using a launch 
vehicle simulator will be performed, After successful 
completion of these tests the spacecraft assembly will be 
electrically mated with the launch vehicle, 
As for the LEM, after a brief receiving inspection 
of the ascent and descent stages, the LEM ascent and descent 
stages will be mated and systems verification tests will be 
performed. Then the LEM and the SLA will be mated and 
electrical interfaces will be checked, 
Combined CSM and LEM tests will be restricted to 
electrical interface checks when the LEM and the CSM are 
electrically connected via an umbilical hardline. No RF 
compatibility tests between the LEM and CSM are planned. 
5.3 Space Vehicle Integration 
After the launch vehicle and the spacecraft have 
been mechanically and electrically mated, interface tests will 
be performed to demonstrate the integrity and functional 
compatibility of the spacecraft and launch vehicle interfaces, 
to checkout the space vehicle emergency detection system, 
and to verify the functional compatibility of' space Vehicle 
sastems and ground support equipment. (For Saturn IB flights 
the spacecraft will be mated to the launch vehicle on the launch 
pad while for the Saturn V flights the spacecraft will be 
mated to the launch vehicle in the Verticle Assembly Building.) 
Following these tests w i l l  be tests to demonstrate the 
compatibility and proper cperation of all space vehicle a d  
ground support equipment during a nominal automatic firing and 
flight sequence both with and without umbilical ejections. 
Malfunction sequence tests will also be performea-on the space 
vehicle. 
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For the Saturn V flights the space vehicle will then 
be moved t o  the launch pad. For the Saturn IB flights the 
Count Down Demonstration Test (CDDT) will follow which shall 
be as close as possible to the actual launch countdown. A 
RF compatibility test of the space vehicle, MILA and ETR RF 
radiating systems will be performed in conjunction with the 
CDDT. During the RF compatibility tests all radio frequency 
systems of the space vehicle, MILA, and ETR will be turned on 
which will be operating during countdown and launch activities. 
All launch vehicle and spacecraft RF systems will be interro- 
gated and/or monitored for indications of malfunction and for 
indications of interference. The RF compatibility tests will 
be performed with the Mobile Service Structure (MSS) in the 
launch location and with the MSS removed from the pad area. 
After the Saturn V space vehicle has been transported 
to the launch pad and the ground support equfpment has been 
connected, systems verification tests will be performed to 
assure that system operation was unaffected by the transportation 
and that the ground support equipment was properly connected. 
In addition to malfunction sequence tests on the space vehicle, 
CDDT and RF Compatibility tests, as described earlier for the 
Saturn IB space vehicles, will then be performed. 
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PROGRAM TO VERIFY ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY IN GEMINI 
1.0 General 
The contractual requirements imposed by the Manned 
Spacecraft Center on the McDonnell Aircraft Company, the prime 
contractor and the agency responsible for integration of the 
Gemini spacecraft systems, are not explicit in the area of 
electromagnetic interference control. Instead, the McDonnell 
Aircraft Company is made responsible for the control of 
electromagnetic interference such that equipment items of 
the spacecraft and associated aerospace ground equipment shall 
not be adversely affected by interference voltages, currents, 
or fields present in their operational environment. Moreover 
these items are required not to produce interference indivi- 
dually or in any combination operationally required which will 
cause malfunction or unacceptable performance degradation of 
other equipment items or subsystems of the spacecraft, launch 
vehicle, target vehicle, and associated aerospace ground 
equipment. 
The basic approach taken by McDonnell for control of 
electromagnetic interference within Gemini was to place 
heavy emphasis on equipment design and test. The design and 
test requirements of the military electromagnetic interference 
control specification, MIL-1-26600, were included to varying 
degrees in the Specification Control Drawing for each of the 
electrical or electronic equipments. The Specification Control 
Drawing defines the technical requirements for the design and 
test of each piece of equipment and also forms part of any 
McDonnell Aircraft Company Purchase Order. Compliance by the 
subcontractor or vendor is contractually required, Functional 
compatibility tests were performed b y  McDonnell to demonstrate 
electromagnetic compatibility of the integrated spacecraft 
rather than conducting specific electromagnetic compatibility 
tests. 
The minimization of interference between the trans- 
mitters and receivers on-board the Gemini spacecraft, the Titan 
launch vehicle and the Agena D target vehicle i s  essential to 
the success of the Gemini missions. For use in transmltter and 
receiver frequency allocation, the harmonics of and the cross 
modulation products of the various on-board transmitter funda- 
mental frequencies were calculated to determine any combinations 
that might produce radio frequency interference in the on-board 
receivers. 
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2.1 EauiDment Design and DeveloDment Phase 
The first formal testing of equipment by subcontractor 
or vendor as required by the McDonnell Aircraft Company was the 
"design approval test" which also included electromagnetic 
interference tests contained in the Specification Control 
Drawing, This testing was performed on engineering models to 
demonstrate that the design of the equipment did comply with 
the requirements contained in the Specification Control 
Drawing. 
A l s o  during this phase, integrated systems tests 
were conducted by McDonnell. Compatibility of the electrical 
and electronic subsystems of the Gemini spacecraft was initially 
tested on the Electronic Systems Test Unit. The Test Unit was 
constructed early in the program for the purpose of demonstrating 
the functional compatibility of the electrical and electronic 
subsystems of the Gemini spacecraft. The mechanical design 
and the layout of the electrical and electronic subsystems of 
the final Gemini spacecraft design were approximated as were 
the cable runs. Other subsystems were not included in the 
Electronic Systems Test Unit. 
Final systems integration tests during this phase 
were conducted by McDonnell on the Compatibility Test Unit. 
The Compatibility Test Unit has become the house spacecraft 
and is configured like a flight spacecraft. Only functional 
compatibility tests were performed. If a malfunction was 
detected, corrective action was taken at that time in the 
appropriate equipment: Any design changes were evaluated on 
either of these test units. 
2.2 Equipment Qualification and Acceptance Test Phase 
The next formal testing of the electrical or electronic 
equipments by the subcontractor or vendor were the qualification 
tests. Early production units were used in these tests which 
included rigid checks of the equipments to demonstrate compli- 
ance with the design requirements set forth in the approved 
Specification Control Drawing, Formal failure analysis and 
corrective action were pursued during these tests. Any waivers 
or deviations to the requirements in the Specification Control 
Drawing requested from McDonnell by the subcontractor or vendor 
were coordinated by McDonnell with the Manned Spacecraft Center, 
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In the next series of formal tests, the actual 
flight equipment hardware for each flight spacecraft was 
tested to measure equipment performance and to ensure proper 
equipment operation but not to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements of the military electromagnetic interference 
control specification, MIL-1-26600, First the pre-delivery 
acceptance tests of the equipments were performed on the 
premises of the subcontractor or vendor, Nearly identical 
tests were performed by McDonnell prior to installation of 
t,he equipments into the spacecraft. It should be noted that 
these tests were concerned primarily with the performance of 
the end items supplied by the contractor or vendor before 
acceptance by the McDonnell Aircraft Company. 
3 . 0  Integrated Systems 
3.1 Integrated Spacecraft Systems Test Phase 
After installation of the equipments into the space- 
craft, performance tests were conducted by the McDonnell 
Aircraft Company prior to spacecraft acceptance by the Manned 
Spacecraft Center and shipment to the launch site. These 
performance tests included module tests, interface verification 
tests, integrated systems tests, and simulated flight tests. 
The McDonnell generated test plan does not in itself contain 
the detailed test procedures for the tests to be performed 
but does reference other documents called Service Engineering 
Department Reports. The test equipment t o  be used, the exact 
test procedure to be followed, and the test data to be recorded 
for each test are described in detail in the appropriate 
Service Engineering Department Reports. 
Of prime importance in these tests was demonstration 
of satisfactory operation of the integrated equipment and of 
spacecraft operational readiness for its mission, This test 
philosophy was based on the belief that major electromagnetic 
incompatibilities would be uncovered during functional tests 
and that testing to demonstrate compliance with a system 
electromagnetic compatibility specification, such as MIL-E-6051C, 
would cause a schedule slip in an already protracted schedule. 
It should be noted that one of the tests of the block 
of tests on the spacecraft included simultaneous operation of 
all systems to permit intersystem operation and compatibility 
tests. A ttfix" was applied as required in the spacecraft 
systems to suppress any electromagnetic interference causing 
malfunction o r  performance degradation of any equipments or 
systems. 
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3.2 Integration of Gemini Spacecraft and Titan Launch Vehicle Phase 
An important electrical as well as a mechanical 
interface exists between the Gemini spacecraft and the Titan 
launch vehicle. The major electrical interface is the inter- 
face between the Gemini guidance computer and the launch 
vehicle guidance system. To date, there has been no signi- 
ficant problems with the various interfaces between the space- 
craft and launch vehicle when mated despite the fact that the 
first time the two had contact was at the launch site. This 
success has been attributed to the work of coordinating 
committees, many meetings, rigidly followed interface speci- 
fication control documents, and tests performed with a simu- 
lated vehicle. The interface control committees were composed 
of representatives from the Manned Spacecraft Center, the 
McDonnell Aircraft Company, the Air Force and 'che Martin Company. 
Tests at the launch site of the spacecraft and launch 
vehicle were minimal to assure there was no damage caused 
during transportation to the launch site until integration of 
the launch vehicle and spacecraft was completed on the launch 
pad. At this time integrated system functional checks were 
performed and radio frequency testing by the Air Force Eastern 
Test Range was performed. Finally simulated flight tests were 
run with assistance from the Eastern Test Range and the Mission 
Control Center to demonstrate proper performance of the final 
space vehicle systems and ground support equipments. 
3.3 Integration of the Gemini Spacecraft and the Agena D 
Target Vehicle Phase 
Similarly, for later Gemini missions, the target 
vehicle, the Agena D, will be integrated with the Gemini space- 
craft for the first time at Cape Kennedy. At no time during 
the development of these vehicles was it possible to provide 
a compatibility test of the two flight vehicles, although 
several tests were run with a simulated vehicle to provide the 
necessary design information. However, the collar structure 
and electronics required on the target vehicle to accomplish 
rendezvous and physical docking of Gemini spacecraft and the 
Agena D target vehicle was supplied by the McDonnell Aircraft 
Company to the contractor for the target vehicle for installation 
and compatibility tests, As was the case for the interfaces 
between the spacecraft and launch vehicle, coordinating committees, 
frequent meetings and interface specification documents played 
important roles in achieving compatibility of the spacecraft 
and target vehicle. 
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To provide a final verification of the compati- 
bility of the combined operations of the Gemini spacecraft 
and the Agena D target vehicle in the various orbital 
configurations, a series of radio frequency and functional 
compatibility tests for Gemini/Agena D were performed at 
Cape Kennedy. The tests included an orbital flight simu- 
lation of the docking maneuver of the Gemini spacecraft 
and ,',gena D target vehicle and functional compatibility 
tests of Gemini/Agena D in both the docked and undocked 
configurations. The specific objectives of these tests 
include: (a) demonstration of Gemini/Agena D hardline and 
radio frequency communication capability to verify satis- 
factory vehicle interfaces, (b) demonstration of proper 
performance of Gemini/Agena D subsystems in the combined 
Gemini/Agena D electromagnetic fields, and (c) demonstration 
of the proper performance of Gemini/Agena D subsystems during 
a simulated mission, 
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ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY AWARENESS COUKSE 
1.0 Background 
It has been recognized in past programs that 
management has been unaware of the importance and necessity 
of electromagnetic compatibility planning and engineering in 
the design and development of a system. All too often electro- 
magnetic compatibility of equipments, of subsystems and of 
the overall integrated system has not been considered until 
final end-item assembly and test. When interference problems 
arise during end-item tests, quick fixes are applied, which 
may compromise the original design, in order to avoid 
schedule slip and additional cost. However, a major redesign 
effort is frequently required, Because of this approach to 
electromagnetic interference control, little information has 
been gathered or disseminated in a form useful to management 
and engineering personnel. Consequently, the state-of-the- 
art of electromagnetic interference control has not kept up 
with the advances in other fields of electronics. 
Recognizing these facts, the Reliability and Quality 
directorate of the Apollo Program Office has contracted the 
General Electric Company, Apollo Support Department, to 
prepare a course and a supporting text to promote an awareness 
of the importance of electromagnetic compatibility planning 
in the Apollo Program and to disseminate electromagnetic 
interference control information throughout the Apollo Program. 
The course was to be designed to introduce the 
personnel, such as project management, design and test engineers 
and manufacturing engineers, to electromagnetic interference 
and associated problems and to make them aware of the possible 
approaches to controlling electromagnetic interference and 
achieving electromagnetic compatibility of the integrated 
system. Although it is yet too early to say how widespread 
the audience will be for this electromagnetic compatibility 
awareness course, current planning indicates that the course 
will be given initially to the interested personnel at the 
Marshall Space Flight Center, and other NASA Centers and then 
possibly to the prime contractors of the NASA Centers f o r  Apollo- 
Saturn, The duration of the course will be one full week which 
will be divided into two parts. The lectures of the first day 
will be slanted primarily toward management although the 
lectures will a l s o  be of interest to the engineering personnel. 
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four days w 1 11 be aimed at the design 
test and manufacturing engineers, primarily the design 
engineers, who have not been intimately concerned with 
electromagnetic interference control. 
A text has been prepared of the electromagnetic 
interference awareness course and is intended to be a con- 
structive aid to the NASA Apollo team in their electromagnetic 
compatibility responsibilities. I t s  purpose is to stimulate 
interest and further promote understanding in the art and 
science of electromagnetic interference control throughout 
the Apollo Program, The first draft of this text entitled, 
"Electromagnetic Compatibility Principles and Practices," 
dated May, 1965, was issued with a limited distribution as 
part of an Apollo Design Reliability series of documents. 
This first draft of the text is currently in publication 
by the Government Printing Office and is expected to be 
widely distributed as a whole or in individual chapters 
throughout the government and industry. It is hoped that feed- 
back of technical additions and corrections to the material 
contained in the text will result from the recipients of the 
documents. The text, it is hoped, will evolve into a set of 
reference documents which present, in technical depth, the 
information needed by the engineer to properly design equip- 
ments for interference free operation and compatibility within 
a system, including design guides and techniques, prediction 
methodology, and testing methods and procedures, 
2.0 Presentation of the Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Awareness Course 
A NASA sponsored workshop on electromagnetic com- 
patibility was held in Daytona Beach, F1-orida, on November 1 
through November 5, 1965, which served as a preview of the 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Awareness Course. Representatives 
from industry, the various NASA centers, the Department of 
Defense, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center 
and some of the members of the G-46 Committee on Electromagnetic 
Compatibility of the Electronics Industries Association partic- 
ipated in this workshop. The objectives of the workshop were 
to stimulate discussions of and information exchange on 
different aspects of electromagnetic compatibility and to obtain 
comments from acknowledged electromagnetic interference control 
specialists on the organization of, the effectiveness of the 
presentation of, and the appropriateness, completeness, and 
technical accuracy of the material contained in the course and 
in the draft of the supporting text, The information and 
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comments obtained during the workshop sessions was to be used 
by the General Electric Company for reworking and refining 
the Electromagnetic Compatibility Awareness Course. 
With Dr. C. Frederick, a recognized leader in the 
field of electromagnetic compatibility noted for the Frederick 
Research Corporation four volume publication, "Handbook on 
Radio Frequency Interference", acting as technical coordinator, 
the Electromagnetic Compatibility Awareness Course was reworked 
and the lecture notes were revised. The revised week-long 
course is divided into 16 one hour lectures with a planned one 
hour discussion period following each lecture. The revised 
course was given at the Michoud Operations Plant in New Orleans, 
Louisiana during the week of April 1 7 ,  1966 to representatives 
from NASA, the Chrysler Corporation Space Division and the 
Boeing Company. Although the revised lecture notes were 
issued to the course attendees, the Apollo Program Office 
publication, ??Electromagnetic Compatibility Principles and 
Practices?', was used as the text for this course. 
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LIGHTNING PROTECTION OF APOLLO-SATURN LAUNCH COMPLEXES 
There are two important modes by which lightning 
strikes can cause damage which must be considered in the 
development of a plan for the protection of launch complexes 
from lightning strikes. These are (a) direct stroke effects 
which could cause damage in the form of burning, blasting, or 
destructive currents or voltage surges in electrical equip- 
ment and (b) damage effects of currents or voltages induced 
in nearby wiring and sensitive electrical equipments by 
electromagnetic fields produced by the lightning stroke. 
An investigation was conducted by the High Voltage 
Laboratory of the General Electric Company under NASA contract 
NASw-410 to determine the possible effects of lightning 
strokes to Apollo-Saturn launch complexes, to review standard 
practices and possible solutions to unique problems, and to 
recommend practices and procedures to protect the launch 
complexes from lightning strikes or to minimize the effects 
of such strikes. The results of this investigation of 
protection of personnel, facilities, ground support equip- 
ment and space vehicle (in transit or on the pad) on Launch 
Complexes 34, 37, and 39 have been published in the following 
two General Electric Company reports which have been distri- 
buted to interested personnel at the Kennedy Space Center, 
the Manned Spacecraft Center, and the Marshall Space Flight 
Center: 
(a) "Lightning Protection f o r  Saturn Launch Complex 39," 
dated September 10, 1963, and 
(b) "Analysis of Lightning Effects on Launch Complex 
34 and 37," dated July 1, 1964. 
These reports were reviewed and the lightning protection 
measures recommended were evaluated by the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, Inc. The results of this review and evaluation 
are included in a memorandum attached to this appendix. 
An ad-hoc lightning protection committee was formed 
in 1963 by NASA to direct the effort of the High Voltage 
Laboratory of the General Electric Company in this investi- 
gation and to develop plans for protecting launch complexes 34, 
37, and 39 against lightning strikes, This committee, chaired 
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by  M r .  H .  D .  Brewster  of  t h e  Kennedy Space Center ,  c o n s i s t e d  
o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  N A S A  c e n t e r s .  A p l a n  was 
developed f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of Launch Complex 39 b y  t h e  ad- 
hoc committee u s i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  per -  
formed b y  t h e  General  E l e c t r i c  Company. T h i s  p l a n  was sub- 
sequen t ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  as p o l i c y  f o r  t h e  Kennedy Space Center  
by  t h e  D i r e c t o r  on June 18 ,  1963. T h i s  p l a n  appears i n  t h e  
Kennedy Space Center  t e c h n i c a l  r e p o r t ,  TR-4-28-2-D, e n t i t l e d ,  
"Lightn ing  P r o t e c t i o n  f o r  S a t u r n  Launch Complex 39," by H .  D. 
Br.ewster and W .  G .  Hughes, da t ed  October 18 ,  1963. 
A s imi la r  l i g h t n i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  p l a n  was developed 
f o r  Launch Complexes 34 and 37 and was e s t a b l i s h e d  a s  p o l i c y  
f o r  t h e  Kennedy Space Center  b y  t h e  D i r e c t o r  on November 30, 
1 9 6 4 .  T h i s  p l a n  f o r  Launch Complexes 34 and 37 w i l l  be t h e  
f i n a l  o b j e c t i v e ,  bu t  i t  i s  recognized  t h a t  complete implemen- 
t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p l a n  may no t  be p r a c t i c a l  o r  economical i f  i t  
i s  imposed on e x i s t i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  immediate a c t i o n .  
F o r  t h e  most  p a r t  t h e  l i g h t n i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  p l a n s  
i n v o l v e  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  b e  conducted b y  t h e  Kennedy Space Center .  
However, t h e  p l a n s  i n c l u d e  two i t ems  which r e q u i r e  a c t i o n  
from t h e  Manned S p a c e c r a f t  Center  and t h e  Marshall Space F l i g h t  
Center .  These i t e m s  a r e  ( a )  t h a t  t h e  e x t e r i o r  c a b l e  t u n n e l s  
on t h e  space  v e h i c l e  should  be made o f  conduct ing  material 
and ( b )  t h a t  t h e  maximum v o l t a g e s  expected to be induced i n  
c i r c u i t s  provided  b y  t h e  N A S A  c e n t e r  as a r e s u l t  of a l i g h t n i n g  
s t r i k e  should  be  examined and p r o t e c t i v e  d e v i c e s  pu t  i n t o  t h e  
c i r c u i t s  i f  r e q u i r e d .  
A t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t ime ,  t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  of  t h e  i n t e r -  
c e n t e r  l i g h t n i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  Apollo-Saturn has 
come under  t h e  purview of t h e  E l e c t r i c a l  Systems P a n e l ,  
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ELECTROSTATIC CHARGING 
1.0 General 
Some concern has been expressed about possible 
problems in Apollo resulting from electrostatic charging of 
the space vehicle during the various phases of the mission. 
These problem areas include: (a) radio frequency interference 
during discharging, (b) arcing between two vehicles during 
separation or during rendezvous causing physical damage, 
(c) discharges of sufficient rapidity and energy to induce 
transient pulses of significant size in sensitive electrical 
circuits, such as electro-explosive devices to cause a 
malfunction, and (d) adhesion of dust layers to the LEM and 
extra-vehicular astronauts during lunar surface operations, 
Electrostatic charging and discharging mechanisms 
are discussed qualitatively in the following paragraphs for 
launch, space coast, and lunar surface operations. Results of 
some of the experiments performed in this field are also 
included, Electrostatic charging due to rocket engine opera- 
tion is discussed in the section on launch operations, but the 
discussion is also applicable to the other sections if the 
engines are operated during those phases, 
2.0 Launch 
Many processes have been postulated by which a space 
vehicle can become electrostatically charged during the launch 
phase, The dominant processes are expected to be external 
triboelectric charging and charging processes resulting from 
rocket engine operation, 
When an electrostatically charged, isolated, elec- 
trically conducting body is asymmetrically separated into 
two bodies, a potential difference will be developed between 
the two bodies. If the potential difference were great enough, 
a redistribution of electrostatic charges by a spark, arc- 
over, or current flow between the two bodies could occur if 
an ionized gas or other conducting path were present. This 
phenomenon might be expected to be applicable to stage separ- 
ation of an electrostatically charged vehicle such as the Saturn 
launch vehicles, 
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2.1 Theoretical 
2.1.1 Triboelectric Charging 
The triboelectric (frictional or contact) charging 
process has long been recognized as a problem when aircraft 
are operated in precipitation or in an atmosphere where there 
are many suspended particles. Aircraft potentials measured 
in the hundreds of kilovolts have been attained as a result of 
triboelectric charging in the atmosphere. Triboelectric 
cfiarging occurs whenever two dissimilar materials with 
different charge carrier mobilities are brought into contact 
and then separated. The charging rate and the polarity of 
the resulting potential depends on the materials involved. 
be launched in adverse weather conditions where precipitation 
is present, a partial cloud cover, ice particles, and possibly 
other particles may be suspended in the atmosphere through 
which the space vehicle will rise. 
Although it is not likely that Apollc-Saturn will 
Another possible instance of electrostatic charging 
through frictional effects will be when the boost protective 
cover is snatched from the spacecraft when the launch escape 
system is jettisoned. 
2.1.2 Rocket Engine Charging 
Many phenomena are expected to occur during rocket 
engine operation which could serve to charge the space vehicle 
electrostatically, although some may have negligible effect 
with respect to other phenomena. It is believed the more 
significant of these phenomena include: 
(a) diffusion of electrons to the rocket engine wall 
due to the greater mobility of the electrons in the 
plasma formed in the combustion chamber during rocket 
engine operation, 
(b) triboelectric or frictional charging effects caused 
by the solid particles in the combustion products 
striking the rocket engine walls, and 
thermionic emission or photoemission resulting from 
the combustion process within the rocket engine. 
(c) 
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To produce large potential differences, the uncollected 
charges must be mechanically removed to large distances from 
the space vehicle, 
The potential of the space vehicle will be limited 
by some discharging processes such as corona discharge in the 
atmosphere or the ability of the charged space vehicle to 
capture a discharging current from the ionized and charged 
exhaust from the rocket engine. This recirculation of the 
charges from the exhaust to this space vehicle will depend 
upon the relative velocity between the charges in the exhaust 
and the space vehicle, the mean free path of the charge, 
electron (or ion depending on polarity of space vehicle) and 
the charge mobility, Thus, as the space vehicle gains 
altitude, the recirculation properties associated with the 
plume should be enhanced. 
2 . 2  Experimental 
There have been a number of electrostatic charging 
experiments performed with small solid-fuel rocket motors 
during static firings, Although all of these experiments 
indicate that solid-fuel rocket motor operation is a definite 
cause of vehicle electrostatic charging, little insight into 
the actual mechanisms has been gleaned from the experiments. 
In addition, little use can be made of the results of the 
experiments in predicting the potentials a space vehicle may 
attain during a launch because the experiments were performed 
in an environment different than that which a space vehicle 
would encounter during an actual launch. 
Results of electrostatic charging tests on various 
small rocket motors performed by the Boeing Company in 1963 
were "scaled" to apply to the Minuteman vehicle. The tests 
showed that a negative charge was deposited on a rocket motor 
burning a Minuteman-type grain, Extending these results 
suggested to Boeing that a Minuteman vehicle might attain a 
potential to cause electrical discharge. In order to control 
any discharge and decouple it from sensitive circuits in the 
vehicle, special corona dischargers were developed for easy 
installations on the vehicle. If electrostatic charging of 
the Saturn vehicle is critical during launch, this method of 
discharging the vehicle may have application to the Saturn 
launch vehicle during passage through the atmosphere. 
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An instrument was installed on a Nike-Cajun vehicle 
by the Stanford Research Institute in 1961 to measure the 
field strength at a point on the Nike-Cajun vehicle skin in 
order to obtain a time history of the potential of the vehicle 
during launch powered flight. Polarity discrimination was not 
incorporated into this instrument nor was the ability to 
discriminate between a true field produced by a n  electro- 
statically charged vehicle and electron or ion collection by 
the instrument in the ionosphere. During the Nike burning 
the vehicle reached a peak potential of 26 kilovolts, but during 
the Cajun burning the peak potential was only about two 
kilovolts. In addition, fairly high vehicle potentials were 
measured above 100 km. 
A similar experiment was conducted on the Nike-Cajun 
vehicle by the Stanford Research Institute in 1965. However, 
the instrument used to measure the electric field strength was 
equipped with a synchronous detection scheme designed to enable 
the instrument to distinguish between a t r u e  electric field and 
a drift current caused by ion or electron collection from the 
environment by the instrument, The results of the experiment 
paralleled the results of the earlier experiment performed in 
1961, with the exception that the potential of the vehicle 
while in the ionosphere never exceeded 5 kilovolts. It is 
believed that the indication of high vehicle potentials in 
the ionosphere during the 1961 experiment was caused by collection 
of ions or electrons from the ionosphere by the instrument. 
Ling Temco Vought Aerospace Corporation instrumented 
a Scout vehicle to measure the field strength at certain points 
on the vehicle skin in order to ascertain a time history of the 
vehicle electrostatic potentials during launch and to measure 
the potential differences between stages during separation 
maneuver, Four sensors were used to make two surface field 
strength measurements and two stage separation potential 
difference measurements. The NASA Scout Evaluation Vehicle, 
S-l3lR, was launched in August, 1965. 
Surface measurements of the field strength were made 
on the second and third stages of the NASA Scout Evaluation 
Vehicle. The measurements indicated that the vehicle reached 
a peak potential of less than 1 kilovolt during the rocket 
motor operation of the first three stages of' the Scout vehicle, 
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Instruments were carried on the NASA Scout Evaluation 
Vehicle to determine the maximum amplitude of the potential 
difference between the system ground points of the first stage 
and the second stage during the first stage separation 
maneuver, and between the system ground points of the second 
stage and the third stage during the second stage separation 
maneuver. A peak instantaneous voltage detector with a rapid 
rise-time response was used to record the peak potential 
differences or transients during separation and the results 
w,ere later telemetered to the earth. During the August, 1965, 
launch of Scout vehicle, S-l3lR, there were no indications of 
recorded potential differences between the two parts of the 
vehicle during the separation maneuver. 
An experiment was carried on SA-10 to measure the 
potential difference between the S-I booster stage and the S-IV 
stage of the Saturn I launch vehicle during separation. A 
continuous voltage measurement was made between the two stages 
during the separation maneuver using a telemetry channel with 
a frequency response of 80 cps, An instantaneous peak voltage 
detector to record any high frequency voltage pulses was not 
used, The result of the experiment indicated no perceptible 
difference between the two stages during separation, 
3.0 Space Coast 
The more important mechanisms for the electrostatic 
charging of a space vehicle coasting in space are collection of 
electrons or ions from the environmental plasma, (either the 
ionosphere or the solar wind), and photoemission. Other 
mechanisms include (a) thermionic emission, (b) secondary 
emission, (c) collisions with other bodies such as micrometeors, 
and (d) field emission. 
3.1 Theoretical 
3.1.1 Electron or Ion Collection 
A space vehicle in space will be continuously bom- 
barded by environmental particles which will be electrically 
charged, such as electrons, ions, and cosmic rays, The incidence 
of such particles, in general, will result in a transfer of 
charge to or from the space vehicle. Since the electrons are 
much more mobile than the positive ions, the space vehicle will 
probably accumulate a negative charge. The electric field 
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around the space vehicle produced by the charge on the space 
vehicle will reduce the number of electrons reaching the space 
vehicle until equilibrium is reached. 
Electron and ion concentrations vary with altitude, 
time, and solar activity. In addition, the Van Allen belts 
in the ionosphere contain high energy particles, The dis- 
charging or charging capability of the electrons or positive 
ions are dependent on the energies and the concentrations of 
the particles and on the relative velocities of the particles 
with respect to the space vehicle. In the solar wind, the 
positive ions are characterized by having mostly directed 
energy, while the electrons are generally randomly directed. 
For  the case of a space vehicle orbiting in the 
ionosphere, equilibrium potentials are expected to be a few 
volts negative, although somewhat higher potentials may be 
attained when passing through the Van Allen radiation belts. 
It is also expected that the equilibrium potential of the space 
vehicle in the solar wind will be limited to a few volts due 
to this charging mechanism of positive ion or electron collection. 
3.1.2 Photoemission 
As the altitude of the space vehicle increases, the 
concentrations of electrons and positive ions in space decreases 
and the process of photoemission becomes more important as a 
charging or discharging mechanism. Photoemission is the process 
by which incident photons of sufficient energy will cause the 
emission of electrons from a space vehicle bathed in sunlight, 
The total electron flow from the space vehicle depends on the 
intensity of the radiation, the area presented by the space 
vehicle t o  the sun, the surface material of the space vehicle, 
and the potential of the space vehicle, 
Since most of the electrons emitted from the space 
vehicle surface due to the photoelectric effect will be low 
energy, it is expected that the space vehicle equilibrium 
potential for this process alone will be limited t o  a few volts 
positive. 
3.1.3 Field Emission 
Field emission is the name of the process by which 
electrons are drawn out of metal surfaces by a large electro- 
static field, Under the action of electrostatic fie-lds of 
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6 7 1 0  -10 vol ts /cm and g r e a t e r ,  e l e c t r o n s  may be drawn o u t  o f  
me ta l  s u r f a c e s  b y  t h e  f i e l d  a l o n e .  F i e l d s  of  t h i s  o r d e r  of 
magnitude may be reached  w i t h  f i n e  p o i n t s  and co rne r s  f o r  a 
p o t e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  as low as 1 , 0 0 0  t o  1 0 , 0 0 0  - v o l t s .  S ince  
t h e  d i s c h a r g e  c u r r e n t  r i s e s  e x p o n e n t i a l l y  w i t h  p o t e n t i a l  
d i f f e r e n c e  above t h i s  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  n e g a t i v e  
p o t e n t i a l  of  t h e  space  v e h i c l e  i n  space  i s  expec ted  to be 
l i m i t e d  to c l o s e  to t h i s  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e .  
3 .2  Experimental  
The Exp lo re r  VI11 S a t e l l i t e ,  launched i n  1 9 6 0 ,  w i t h  
a p e r l g e e  of 420  k i l o m e t e r s  and an  apogee of 2300 k i l o m e t e r s  
con ta ined  i n s t r u m e n t s  to measure e l e c t r o n  d e n s i t y  and temper- 
a t u r e ,  p o s i t i v e  i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  and mass, and t h e  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n  between t h e  v e h i c l e  and t h e  i o n i z e d  atmosphere.  Thc. 
r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  from t h e  s i n g l e - g r i d  e l e c t r o n  t r a p  c a r r i e d  by 
t h i s  s a t e l l i t e  were ana lyzed  and t h e  s a t e l l i t e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o t e n t i a l  was c a l c u l a t e d ,  It was shown t h a t  t h e r e  i s  g e n e r a l  
agreement between t h e  p r e d i c t e d  v a l u e  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o t e n t i a l  
o f  a f e w  v o l t s  and t h e  measured v a l u e .  
An experiment was c a r r i e d  on t h e  Gemini IV space- 
c r a f t  to measure t h e  Gemini s p a c e c r a f t  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  p o t e n t i a l  
v i a  t h e  measurement of  e l e c t r i c  f i e l d  s t r e n g t h  du r ing  ear th  
o r b i t a l  c o a s t .  The data from t h i s  v o l t a g e  experiment i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  very h igh  p o s i t i v e  s p a c e c r a f t  p o t e n t i a l s  ( 2  x 1 0  6 ) e x i s t e d  
f o r  extended p e r i o d s  of  t i m e .  These r e s u l t s  were coun te r  to 
prev ious  expe r imen ta l  r e s u l t s  as w e l l  as to t h e  c u r r e n t  
t h e o r e t i c a l  unde r s t and ing  of e l e c t r o s t a t i c  cha rg ing  o f  s a t e l l i t e s  
o r b i t i n g  i n  t h e  ionosphe re ,  It was p o s t u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
appa ren t  s p a c e c r a f t  p o t e n t i a l  was due to some cause o t h e r  t h a n  
t r u e  s p a c e c r a f t  p o t e n t i a l ,  such as t h e  e f f e c t s  of p o s i t i v e  
i o n  o r  e l e c t r o n  c o l l e c t i o n  by t h e  s e n s o r ,  Pos t  f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  
of t h e  experiment  i n s t rumen t  i n d i c a t e d  t h e  in s t rumen t  to b e  
s e n s i t i v e  to r a d i o  f requency  energy and f l u x e s  of charged plasma 
p a r t i c l e s  i n c i d e n t  to t h e  s e n s i n g  f a c e  of t h e  i n s t r u m e n t .  
The same experiment  was c a r r i e d  on t h e  Gemini V 
s p a c e c r a f t  modi f ied  to exclude e l e c t r i c  f i e l d s  from t h e  s e n s o r  
wh i l e  a l lowing  t h e  s e n s o r  to d e t e c t  unbalanced s p a c e c r a f t  
c u r r e n t s  which may have been c o l l e c t e d  by t h e  s e n s o r  c a r r i e d  
on t h e  Gemini IV s p a c e c r a f t .  The r e a d i n g s  o f  t h e  s e n s o r  
t e l e m e t e r e d  to t h e  e a r t h  from t h e  Gemini V s p a c e c r a f t  were very  
s imilar  to t h e  d a t a  ob ta ined  from t h e  GeminiIV s p a c e c r a f t .  I n  
view of t h e s e  r e s u l t s ,  t h e  data from Gemini IV cannot be  i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  i n  terms of  s p a c e c r a f t  p o t e n t i a l  bu t  must be i n t e r p r e t e d  
i n  terms of unbalanced s p a c e c r a f t  c u r r e n t s .  
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4.0 Lunar SurTace Operations 
The effects of the various postulated electrostatic 
charging and discharging mechanisms on lunar operations and 
crew extra-vehicular activities on the lunar surface cannot be 
as accurately estimated as are the effects on the launch and 
space coast operations because of the greater number of unknowns. 
The more dominant electrostatic charging or discharging 
mechanisms are expected to be the motion over the dry surface 
of,the moon, the solar wind, and photoemission. 
Knowledge of the electrical conductivity and the 
dielectric constant of the materials composing the local lunar 
surface and the Extra-Vehicular Mobility Unit is required in 
order to determine the magnitude and polarity of any electro- 
static charge accumulated by an extra vehicular astronaut moving 
across the lunar surface, It is not expected that this process 
will result in dangerous charge accumulations, 
It is expected that the electrostatic discharging 
qualities of the solar wind will be sufficient to dissipate any 
large charge accumulations due to motion over the lunar surface 
unless the lunar surface is shielded from the solar wind, If 
the space vehicle and astronauts are on the dark side of the 
moon, the solar wind could only be effective in dissipating 
positive charges because the positive ions have mostly directed 
energy while the electrons are mostly thermalized. 
The photoelectric effect will also aid in dissipating 
a negative charge on the space vehicle or astronauts who are 
located on the sunlit portion of the lunar surface. 
5.0 Conclusions 
It would be expected that first stage separation would 
be the most critical portion of the launch phase with respect 
to the possible deleterious effects resulting from electrostatic 
charge accumulations on the skin of the space vehicle. However 
results of experiments on a Saturn I Launch Vehicle and on a 
Scout vehicle suggest that arcing between launch vehicle stages 
during separation will not be a problem, 
The plasma of the ionosphere will act as an efficient 
discharge mechanism as the space vehicle rises into the ionosphere 
during the launch maneuver and is expected t o  limit the electro- 
static charge accumulation on the space vehicle to non-hazardous 
amounts, It is known that steady state potentials of space 
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v e h i c l e s  c o a s t i n g  i n  ear th  o r b i t  i n  t h e  ionosphere  w i l l  be a 
few v o l t s  n e g a t i v e .  I f  a space  v e h i c l e  should  a c q u i r e  a l a r g e  
e l e c t r o s t a t i c  charge by an independent  p rocess  such as r o c k e t  
engine o p e r a t i o n ,  t h e  ionosphere  w i l l  a c t  to d i s c h a r g e  t h e  
space  v e h i c l e  r a p i d l y .  
For space  v e h i c l e s  c o a s t i n g  i n  o u t e r  space ,  i t  i s  
expected t h a t  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o t e n t i a l  of t h e  space v e h i c l e  
w i l l  r ange  f r o m  a few v o l t s  p o s i t i v e  to a few v o l t s  n e g a t i v e  
dqpending upon which e f f e c t  predominates ,  photoemission or 
t h e  s o l a r  wind, The s o l a r  wind w i l l  a c t  i n  a manner s imi la r  
to t h e  ionosphere  b u t  a t  a reduced r a t e  i n  d i s c h a r g i n g  a space  
v e h i c l e  a c q u i r i n g  a l a r g e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  charge by an independent  
p r o c e s s ,  
T h e  e f f e c t s  of  t h e  s o l a r  winds, photoemission,  and 
c o n t a c t  f r i c t i o n  due to motion on t h e  l u n a r  s u r f a c e  d u r i n g  
l u n a r  s u r f a c e  o p e r a t i o n s  are no t  expec ted  t o  cause dangerous 
e l e c t r o s t a t i c  charge  accumulat ions on t h e  LEM or t h e  e x t r a -  
v e h i c u l a r  a s t r o n a u t s .  
I n  summary, a l though it  i s  recognized  :hat more 
expe r imen ta l  data would be d e s i r a b l e  to v e r i f y  some of t h e  
above assumptions and conc lus ions ,  space v e h i c l e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  
charg ing  and p o s s i b l e  r e s u l t i n g  e f f e c t s  are not  expec ted  to 
cause hazardous s i t u a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  space v e h i c l e  or t h e  
a s t r o n a u t s  d u r i n g  any of t h e  Apollo mis s ion  phases .  
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VOLTAGE BREAKDOWN IN ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENTS 
1.0 General 
Voltage breakdown in the form of glow, corona, flash- 
over, streamer discharge, or arc discharge has resulted in or 
has been suspected of causing the failure of space electronic 
equipment as well as causing electromagnetic interference. The 
probability of voltage breakdown is increased by operation of 
electronic equipment in the critical gas or air pressure region 
or operation of electronic equipment in a plasma. In addition, 
breakdown can occur in a vacuum by means of the multipactor 
effect, These mechanisms will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
2.0 Critical Gas or Air Pressure 
The probability of voltage breakdown is enhanced by 
operating the equipment in reduced gas pressures corresponding 
to atmospheric pressures found at altitudes from 65,000 to 
310,000 feet. For example, within this critical pressure 
region, the air dielectric will break down with less than 300 
volts across exposed flat plates separated by an appropriate 
distance. 
Operation of electronic equipment in the critical 
pressure region not intended for operation in those environ- 
ments can occur as a result of (a) partial loss of vacuum 
during vacuum testing, (b) decompression of pressurized vessels, 
(c) repressurization after decompression, (d) inadvertent 
equipment activation during the launch phase as the space vehicle 
passes through the thinning atmosphere, (e) outgassing of 
materials producing localized critical pressures under vacuum 
conditions, and (f) gases trapped in enclosures inadequately 
vented to the ambient environment, 
Following are a few examples of voltage breakdown 
problems occurring in space vehicle equipments. 
(a) It is highly probable that the failure of the tele- 
vision subsystem of Ranger VI was caused by voltage 
breakdown after inadvertent turn-on of the television 
subsystem during the launch phase, 
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(b) During the thermal-vacuum testing of one of the 
Mariner spacecraft when all electrical subsystems 
were operating, an inadvertent increase in the 
pressure in the test chamber subjected the Mariner 
spacecraft to operation in the critical pressure 
region with disasterous results to much of the 
electronic equipment. 
(c) Two failures occurred in the camera subsystems of 
the Nimbus spacecraft when the camera subsystems 
were accidentally activated when the pressure in 
the environmental chamber was within the critical 
zone. Also uncovered during the thermal-vacuum 
tests on the Nimbus spacecraft were voltage break- 
downs between various conductors within partially 
sealed connectors. 
(d) Problems with the photomultiplier of the spectrum- 
heliograph carried by OSO-2 in earth orbit were 
attributed to high voltage breakdown. 
(e) Glow discharges in the transponder used with the 
rendezvous radar subsystem of the Gemini spacecraft 
observed during thermal-vacuum testing was traced 
to partial pressures produced in the poorly 
ventilated enclosure of the high voltage circuitry 
by outgassing of a silicon grease, 
(f) During thermal-vacuum testing of various Apollo Lunar 
Excursion Module equipments, voltage breakdowns 
occurred in the VHF transceiver and in the Unified 
S-Band transponder. 
In addition to voltage breakdown in electrical and 
electronic equipments, voltage breakdown of space vehicle 
antenna subsystems is a possible problem area. The field 
strength required for antenna breakdown is considerably less 
for operation in a plasma or in the presence of a very thin 
ambipolar diffusion layer (space charge present) than for 
operation in non-ionized atmospheres. 
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3.0 Plasma 
It has been shown in a laboratory that arc discharges 
between two electrodes can occur at voltages as low as 30 
volts dc in the presence of a plasma. A scintillation dis- 
charge is often sufficient to trigger such an arc discharge. 
A scintillation discharge is produced in the following 
manner. When a thin dielectric film, such as an oxide film, 
is present on a conductor the voltage difference between the 
plasma and the conductor is impressed across the thin film 
resulting in large voltage gradients for modest voltage 
differences (30 volts). These gradients are sufficient to 
break down the thin film. 
During a series of Agena flights, an occasional 28 
volt battery short circuit occurred at the time of booster 
separation. It was postulated, although never proven, that 
the exhaust from retrorocket operation entered the aft section 
of the Agena vehicle and the 28 volt battery was shorted out 
by an arc discharge between two connector pins in the presence 
of a plasma triggered by a scintillation discharge. After the 
hole where the exhaust plasma could have entered the aft 
section of the Agena vehicle was plugged, the problem of 28 
volt battery shorting never reappeared. 
There are times during a space mission when the space 
vehicle antennas are in a conducting medium as would be 
encountered in the ionosphere or in the plasma surrounding the 
vehicle during re-entry into the atmosphere and sometimes 
during launch. The field strength necessary to cause voltage 
breakdown of an antenna in a conducting medium is considerably 
less than that required to cause voltage breakdown of an 
antenna in an air dielectric. Voltage breakdown at an antenna 
is evidenced by a sharp increase in reflected power and a 
reduction of power radiated from the antenna. 
4.0 Multipactor Breakdown 
Multipactor breakdown is a redio frequency resonant 
discharge dependent upon electrode material and spacing, gas 
pressure, radio frequency voltage and frequency. This breakdown 
is caused by electrons being accelerated between two electrodes 
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connected to a radio frequency source and the multiplication 
of free electrons between the electrons by secondary emission. 
The exciting voltage must be at a frequency corresponding to 
the electrode spacing such that a polarity reversal will occur 
on the electrodes at the moment of electron impact with each 
electrode. The electrode material must be such that more than 
one electron will be released from the electrode for each 
electron impacting the electrode when accelerated by a 
sufficiently large radio frequency voltage between the electrodes, 
In addition, the mean free path of the electrons must be 
sufficiently long to allow the accelerated electrons to impact 
the electrode alternately in phase with the radio frequency 
voltage. 
5.0 Summary 
The major cause of voltage breakdown failure of 
electrical and electronic equipments experienced in space 
vehicles to date has been the operation of these equipments in 
the critical air or gas pressure region. Critical gas 
pressures in the operating environment of these equipments 
could be caused by decompression of the space vehicle and 
subsequent repressurization, outgassing of materials in a 
vacuum, and inadequate venting of equipment enclosures. 
Although failures in electrical and electronic 
equipments can result from multipactor breakdown which should 
not be overlooked it is a phenomenon requiring specialized 
conditions and is not likely to be a problem, 
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SATURN APOLLO ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY DESIGN CRITERIA 
ICD 13M60004 
A copy of the Interface Control Document (ICD) 
13M60004 entitled, "Saturn Electromagnetic Compatibility Design 
Criteria", approved by the co-chairmen of the Instrumentation 
and Communication Panel in August, 1965 is attached to this 
appendix, ICD 13M60004 covers the electromagnetic interface 
between the Apollo spacecraft and the Saturn launch vehicle. 
It recognizes the Electromagnetic Compatibility Subpanel of the 
Instrumentation and Communication Panel as the agency responsible 
for the examination and subsequent resolution of any suspected 
incompatibilities of the interface between the spacecraft and 
the launch vehicle. 
The major portion of this ICD is devoted to defining 
wiring design criteria including requirements on separation, 
shielding, routing, and bundling based on the classification 
of circuits to be interconnected. It invokes the conducted and 
radiated interference requirements of the military electromagnetic 
interference control specifications, M I L - I - ~ ~ ~ O O  (as amended 
by MSC-EMI-1OA) and MIL-I-6181D on the individual equipments 
of the spacecraft and the launch vehicle, respectively. In 
addition to including those design requirements contained in the 
military electrical bonding specification MIL-B-5087A, this 
ICD includes other requirements to ensure proper electrical 
bonding across the interface of the spacecraft and the launch 
vehicle, 
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( a )  Each audio frcqtiency o r  pulse sigml . 
(b) Each DC pover  lead 
. .  
(c )  Each group of three  phase AC rrY1l connected power lezds 
(d) Each sinGle phase AC power lead if routed separately from 
5-3-3.2 
. .  
group of three phisc kC power Scads 
Rc?r;Jc Reauirerfimnt f o r  RnrI3.o Froaucncy CircuZts 
A return f o r  each radio frequency circuit sha l l  always accozqany 
each radio fizqusncy sif;nsl. Ur.der no circumstances shall. my RP 
bxnd.ss3.on l b e  be uazd that does not blicrently provLde a rztum 
and an RF shield (the W shield and t h e  signal rat- may be tho s a n ~  
in the  cas0 of coaxial Ca5lc), 
. .  
5.3.3.3 I t i r ing  Procedure . d 
The following s teps  shall be f.ollo~,:cd k, ";ko h q h m n t a t i c ~  of the  
\ 
wiring procedure 
. 
, . I  
t 
0 
ri 
C 2  ICD '3 Ll 1:hiCh cir c c i t  appars. 
-! .,
A* 'i -3 end as 
be cn all which 

5.3.4 
5 3.1,. 1 
5.3.. rc.3 
5.3 
5.3 
5 
5 . 1  
5.3.5.1.1 
5.3.5.1.2 
c h r a c t e r i s t i c s  Cf 2. -.&re JG 0 
a5 fo l loxs :  
i 
i '  
r -  
Two ccnductor t w i s t e d  shielded &e util izislg rzctlo frequency 
(>SO XC) &Msld&g and kavhg Q diefeetrio which produces a low' 
constant capacitance betwen each cotlciuctor md ";,z shield, arA between 
conductors: 
5.3.5.2 ' V i r e  Type f o r ,  Radio Frcqucnc.lt Ci rcu i t s  
Interconnection of radio freqccncg circuits, other  thzn r:avepide, 
s b l l  be shicldcd co,zUial cable,. or bab-zccd shielded IT' cable wi.t'n a 
5.3.5.3 
Skeet 15 
5 03.5.3.2 
5*3*5*4 
5.3.6 
5.3.6.1 
5.3.6.2 
5.3.7 
connectoci to st ructure  at a U  disconnects. 
Ifire Twi.sting Reauirerr.cr;t s 
A l l  tr3rinE; requiring tw3.sti.z:: as CSLLCC 
ALL c i rcu i t s  c h s s i f i c d  KL L i  S-kep I (5.3.4) may be routed together 
in one bundle, m d  t h e  bundle shall carry a ?>cadlo code of  I.%. 
c i rcu i t s  classified I-IO may bo routed together in one bundle which shall 
A l l  
h . .  UC i- .! .L. cPxu5.b. 
: 504 
5.4.1 
5.!!..2 
5. I+. 2.1 
5 . 5  
., - 
)./*.- 
ab 
bo 
C. 
. .  
I1 0 
Shie lds  o ther  Lhm C O 2 X  currer-t . _ .  
Bon:': 3 n 
.*. ' . ,. + 
d-.. _." Of 
, 
5.50201 
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